The Dynamics of Reform and Revolt in Current South Africa

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I. FROM APARTHEID TO REFORM: THE IDEOLOGICAL PREPARATION FOR THE TOTAL ONSLAUGHT

INTRODUCTION

All the ingredients for a climactic eruption in South Africa have been present for decades. Even this potential remains unfulfilled. So much so that one rates doomsday scenarios not so much on predictive accuracy as on the originality and freshness of new assumptions. South Africa is waiting to become — a hovering society. Almost universal agreement on the untenability of the present is matched by equally deep differences on the pattern for the future. The conflict is also rooted in the divergence and diversity of hopes about what is to come. South Africa is not a hopeless society; perhaps that is why its central conflict appears to be so intractable. Some have what others want, and others are determined to monopolize what some want to get at. It is a deeply divided society where one side's dreams and expectations for the future becomes the other's threat to, and frustration of, the present. That is also why it is increasingly becoming a violent, bitter, and brutalized society. People are beginning to hate each other out of the future.

The question is, why? What is the underlying issue? Is it class, race, ethnicity? Obviously greed, intolerance, fear, are primordial emotions that run deep in South Africa, but they epitomize rather than explain the dilemma. South Africa escapes analytical precision and closure. It is a land of shifting paradigms: Marxists end up making concessions to race and ethnicity, liberals to class, and pluralists to almost anything that disturbs their train of thought. Very often residual categories in one framework pop up into prominence at the very moment their irrelevance has been defined.

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Because analyses of South Africa are often so starkly diver-
gent, it provides a fertile climate for ideological dogmatism. Dif-
ferences of opinion, tactics and strategy, often blow up into major
confrontations and are seized upon to pronounce on moral sanity,
sincerity of commitment, or some anticipated state of grace or
retribution. Ideological certainty depends on intellectual com-
promise, and South Africa is rife with compromised intellectuals
who know better but refrain from saying so. The need for cer-
tainty is often the most compelling evidence for uncertainty.
Sometimes ending on the loser's side is a greater sin than being
right. It becomes easy to confuse silence for wisdom.

What then is the underlying issue? Perhaps it is easier, if not
necessarily safer, to begin with elimination. Although South
Africa shares many of the characteristics of a typical colonial
society, it is not. It has the characteristics of a typical colonial
society without the colonial options of external metropole inter-
vention, or minority withdrawal toward it, or both. Algeria had
France; Rhodesia, Britain; Mozambique and Angola, Portugal.
South Africa has neither this kind of retreat nor intervenor. Any-
one who plans strategy on the assumption that it has is preparing
for a false confrontation. And it is not very helpful to view South
Africa as "colonialism of a special kind," as some Marxist scholars
do.[1] A civil war can be seen only as a stage in a "special" colonial
struggle at enormous cost to human and natural resources before
the error inevitably will have to be acknowledged. And yet, it is
precisely South Africa's colonial past without the "normal" de-
colonialization option on the way to the future which makes the
resolution of the present conflict so intractable and costly.

If South Africa is locked into a conventional class conflict, it
so far stubbornly refuses to come to terms with it. At present
there are simply too many "false consciousnesses" straying across

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[1] A good overview of this debate is contained in an article by Peter Hudson,
"The Freedom Charter and the Theory of National Democratic Revolution," *Trans-
formation* 1 (1986): 6–39.

enemy lines. And yet, nobody can deny that South Africa has all the characteristics of a class struggle: extraordinary concentration of capital, collusion between state and business at key periods in its history, and a growing political and alienated working class. However, it is precisely because of the intransigence of racial and ethnic factors that good old-fashioned Marxists are tempted to look on South Africa as first having to resolve the struggle for "national liberation" (colonialism of a special kind) before settling down to the "real" class revolution.

It is difficult to find any black liberals among workers and working-class academics. This does not serve to inhibit the optimism of liberal economists that South Africa will inevitably "grow" itself out of its present crisis if only the philosophy and practice of free enterprise is allowed to have its way. Too often the "if only" qualification becomes an intellectual escape route. There is enough evidence from the past that growth without efficient political redistribution increases a sense of relative deprivation and compounds the conflict. At the same time, it is quite true that without growth in the economy the politics of redistribution dies on the vine. It is as futile to attempt to redistribute what society does not have as it is dangerous to refuse to distribute as equitably as possible what it does have. However, more than a few big businessmen's courage has failed them when they have had to face the political consequences of this kind of economic analysis. It is almost pointless to wax eloquent on the virtues of free enterprise in a politically unfree South Africa; it is not so pointless to ponder how well free enterprise will survive in a politically free South Africa. How compatible is freedom with the demand for equality?

The underlying issue is not really apartheid. Apartheid is simply the flare that illuminates the scene of battle. From South Africa's colonial past, in every class analysis which comes to grips with the complexities of the present as well as the source of tension in the liberal economist's attempt to reconcile growth and

redistribution lies the issue of *white minority domination: socially, economically, and politically.*

Obviously colonial conquest created the social and political infrastructure for white domination, and British and Dutch trade and financial imperialism gave it economic context. Apartheid was Afrikaner-Nationalism's uniquely "South African way" of articulating white domination. It was also a futile and therefore brutal attempt to escape the pitfalls and consequences of continued colonialism. Whatever the case, it is on the fact and intractability of white minority domination where the paradigms of liberals, pluralists, and Marxists briefly converge before they go their separate ways to explain its significance and to predict its end.

And today, when international anger, outrage, and moral revulsion are mobilized to sanction the obstinacy of apartheid and domestic forces revolt to bring about its demise, what is at issue in the "total dismantling of apartheid" is not only doing away with racist legislation or giving "blacks a fair deal" or even "sharing political power" (whatever that implies). *It means a transfer of political power away from exclusive white domination and with the demonstrable support of the total adult population, no matter how this support is manifested or how long it will endure.* This is the central issue at stake in the international and domestic pressure building up against those in power in South Africa.

The South African state has responded to this pressure with a "program of reform"; this in turn has precipitated revolt on a scale not experienced before in this century. It is the purpose of these few lectures to stimulate some discussion on the current dynamics of reform and revolt in South Africa. I will try to do so in three talks, each one concentrating on a different perspective on the relationship between reform and revolt. First, I wish to discuss the ideological shift from apartheid to "reform," after which I wish to illustrate how this shift is reflected in policy, bureaucracy, and new institutions. Finally, I wish to look at the whole area of reaction or resistance to the reform, which I broadly

refer to as revolt. I say broadly because I wish to discuss not only the political actions of domestic and exiled groups experiencing repression and reform but also wider responses to the South African community, such as international pressure through diplomatic isolation, sanctions, and so on.

Before I begin discussing the ideological shift from apartheid to reform, a brief methodological note could be useful. Throughout I will refer to those in power as the South African state, rather than the government or the regime or the Nationalist party. The reasons for this will become obvious as my analysis proceeds. At this stage, I only wish to say that I regard the South African state as an autonomous entity with its own goals, structure, and interests. I do not use it in any mystical, disembodied, or holistic sense but in the sense of a collective unit manned by real people with definable interests, where those interests cannot simply be seen as an extension or reflection of class interests or where they are simply the "disinterested" or "neutral" protectors of a state structure within which other interest groups pursue their goals. My use of the word "state" in analyzing the dynamics of reform and revolt is similar to that of Skocpol in her fascinating analysis of revolutions in Russia, France, and China, although I do not for one moment intend to embarrass her with the crudity of my own attempt.[2]

FROM APARTHEID TO REFORM

There was, of course, a time when colonialism was fashionable and white domination unproblematical. It was a time, particularly between the two world wars of this century, when whites in South Africa and southern Africa had their heyday. South Africa belonged to the Commonwealth and its whites were decorated as war heroes, won Olympic medals, and had "representative" sporting tours to and from other countries; its political leaders could

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[2]Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

even qualify as "statesmen" of international repute, as in the case of General Jan C. Smuts, a close confidant of Winston Churchill.

However, by the end of the Second World War, the West, in particular, was beginning to feel the impact of powerful philosophical and economic forces. Slavery, racism, and economic exploitation became anathema, and these, together with the declining economic fortunes of the former colonial powers, made decolonization a very attractive option. As this process gathered momentum, so the very idea of white domination became increasingly embarrassing and repugnant. Wherever there was majority domination — for example, in the United States of America, Canada, Australia, New Zealand — whites could successfully impose their own variations of liberal democratic governments and gradually, through force of circumstances, accommodate those who were not white into the arms of government and social and economic life. By the time the pressures for decolonization gathered momentum, these white-majority dominated societies, together with white-minority dominated South Africa, had, through various processes, gained independence. The drive for independence during the post—World War II period of decolonization was also a drive to get rid of white minority domination in India, Ghana, Nigeria, Northern Rhodesia, Tanganyika, Nyasaland, and so on. A last-minute desperate attempt to gain special "South African-like status" for white domination was Rhodesia's futile attempt at Unilateral Declaration of Independence on November 17, 1965.

South Africa had independence at the onset of decolonization after World War II. But the whites who elected the government were determined not to succumb to the same pressures which gave it momentum. Having had all the economic and political privileges of colonial administration without the option of imposing a majority solution on the domestic situation, or minority withdrawal to the metropole, most whites were determined to set themselves apart from the majority of people in their own country and continue to maintain a colonial lifestyle despite decoloniza-

tion. Thus with the advent of Nationalist party rule in 1948 was born apartheid, or separateness. The first two Afrikaner Nationalist premiers, Daniel F. Malan and Johannes G. Strydom, were quite crude and unsophisticated about the racist measures with which they attempted to maintain the segregated privileges of whites. In their era, 1948–58, the basic legal infrastructure of apartheid was created: the Population Registration Act No. 30, 1950; Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act No. 55, 1949; Immorality Amendment Act No. 21, 1950; Reservation of Separate Amenities Act No. 49 of 1953; Group Areas Act, No. 41, 1950, as well as the group of statutes, laws, and proclamations broadly known as the pass laws, which primarily affected the movement of black Africans. There was an absolute frenzy of legislative action during the first ten years without any coherent ideological justification other than the simple "Baasskap," a word coined by Strydom: in "his own" country the white man was going to be "boss."

Ironically, it took a Dutch-born naturalized Afrikaner, Hendrik F. Verwoerd, to realize the complete untenability of this approach in the prevailing African and international climate. He became prime minister after Strydom in 1958, and until his assassination in 1966, a torrent of energy was unleashed in Afrikaner academic and cultural circles to develop a coherent and intellectually defensible ideology for apartheid. It became "separate development." Verwoerd was its architect and supreme articulator. He defended it in international circles when he led South Africa out of the Commonwealth and into a republic, and with tireless zeal he convinced his supporters that separate development was not only morally just but the only way out of the problem and away from white domination. His white opponents in the old United party were defenseless against his attack that their alternative was simply a "softer" variation of white domination, and those opponents left of the United party were simply accused of exchanging one form of racial domination for another.

Verwoerd understood quite clearly that the challenge posed by Africa's demand for independence had to be met also in South Africa. For Africa generally, this demand meant that white minorities had to relinquish exclusive political control or withdraw to the mother country or both. Verwoerd was going to do exactly the opposite — instead of getting rid of the whites, he was going to get rid of the blacks. In fact, one of his protégés, Dr. Connie Mulder, then minister of information and the crown prince to succeed John Vorster as prime minister, could with a straight face argue in the white parliament ten years later that once separate development had been fully implemented, there would be "no black South Africans." From a very important perspective separate development was a massive exercise in social engineering aimed at denationalizing the majority of South Africa's citizens.

South Africa, so the separate-development theory goes, is not a land consisting of black and white people. It is a culturally diverse population— in fact a plurality of cultural minorities. There is not one nation in South Africa but many nations striving for independence. Just as Europe and its colonial masters were assisting African nations toward maturity and independence, so the whites in South Africa had to assist the black ethnic tribes (nations) in South Africa to their independence. The 1913 and 1936 Land Acts of South Africa had set aside traditional African land for blacks. This should form the geographic basis where the different black African nations would live out their political aspirations. As each one eventually took full independence so their citizens would lose their South African citizenship and become foreigners just like any other foreigner who visited what would then be white South Africa. Once all these nations were "independent," the problem of white domination would have been solved, because there would be no blacks to dominate.

Upon the existing racist legal infrastructure built to achieve Malan and Strydom's goal of apartheid, Verwoerd now constructed a new legal superstructure called separate development.

Key elements of both structures were intimately related to one
another, but there were many aspects of apartheid not necessary
for separate development and vice versa. But that was for an-
other era to discover — when "reforms" became fashionable.
Initially Verwoerd was reluctant to go for "full independence"
for blacks, feeling that this was an option forced on the white
minority by the outside world, but by the time of his assassination
in 1966, the Department of Bantu Administration was the major
bureaucracy of government and most of the legislative under-
pinning for separate development in the pipeline. In fact, John
Vorster, who succeeded Verwoerd, spent the next ten years (1966-
76) primarily doing two things: giving content to Verwoerd's
version of internal "independence" and creatingan encompassing
network of far-reaching security laws and measures in order to be
able to act against those who did not comply.

The point I wish to emphasize about the period of apartheid
and separate development, which has been thoroughly researched,
is that the aim was to maintain white minority domination at a
time when this was the distinctive feature of colonial administra-
tion and when every antislavery, anti-Nazi, antiracist and anti-
capitalist exploitation lobby could cite this as an example of the
ultimate evil. When, in a sense, the West was going one way,
South African whites were going the other. This alone guaranteed
that South Africa would remain controversial in international
affairs for a long time to come.

But another point I wish to emphasize about the apartheid-
separate-development era is of domestic or internal relevance. The
whole exercise created a massive and pervasive bureaucracy—
a new state structure which began to take on a life of its own.
Not many countries can compare with South Africa where its size
is concerned. By 1985 the political system had given birth to
thirteen houses of Parliament or legislative assemblies, as well as
the President's Council with quasi-legislative functions. There are
three legislative chambers in the Central Parliament, six legisla-

tive assemblies in what are termed the "nonindependent black states," and four legislative assemblies in the "independent states."

Occupying seats in these fourteen bodies are 1,270 members, consisting of 308 members of the three houses of the Central Parliament; 60 members of the President's Council, 501 members of the legislative assemblies of the non-independent black states, and 401 members of the legislative assemblies of the independent black states of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, and Ciskei. Of the 1,270 persons, 121 are ministers of government (approximately one out of ten), and in addition, there are at least 21 deputy ministers.

Each of the legislative organs has government departmental structures which, by August 1986, had spawned 151 government departments in South Africa. These departments included 18 departments of health and welfare; 14 departments of education; 14 departments of finance and budget; 14 departments of agriculture and forestry; 12 departments of works and housing; 13 departments of urban affairs or local government; 9 departments of economic affairs or trade and industry, as well as 5 departments of foreign affairs, transport, posts and telegraphs, labor and manpower, law and order, defense or national security; 3 departments of justice, 1 department of mineral and energy affairs, 1 department of environmental affairs and tourism. Finally, these 140 departments were responsible to eleven presidents, prime ministers, or chief ministers in South Africa.

As M. Savage wryly observes: "This legislative network with 121 Ministers and 151 Government Departments is not cheap to run."[3] It may not be cheap to run, but it certainly provides security of income and many privileges for those who work for it. As time went by, those involved in it developed a powerful vested interest in keeping the whole system going, whatever the ideological goals it was supposed to pursue. The original idea, of course, was that

[3]M. Savage, "The Cost of Apartheid," Inaugural Lecture, University of Cape Town, 1986.

all these duplicated departments and legislative assemblies would reach a certain level of maturity, would take off and develop separately and independently. South Africa would then have its own "commonwealth of sovereign nations," which could even broaden into a "confederation of Southern African States."

Vorster was the last National party prime minister who seriously tried to pursue the goals of old-style separate development and apartheid. But even during his period of office the cracks were beginning to show. The first right-wing breakaway occurred in the beginning of the 1970s because of concessions to multiracial sport; a parliamentary Commission of Inquiry into Homeland Consolidation concluded that it was a futile and economically unproductive exercise (thus undermining a cherished goal of separate development), and the Commission of Inquiry into the position of the Coloured population group concluded that it had to be accommodated on all levels of government in South Africa.

Separate development, which was essentially centrifugal by design, was also being eroded by powerful centripetal demographic and economic forces. The decade of the seventies saw an accelerated rate of overall but particularly black urbanization, increased economic integration, and far-reaching changes in black labor organizations. Black resistance and alienation was rapidly developing and exploded with the Soweto riots of 1976, when the compulsory instruction of Afrikaans was seized upon by black schoolchildren to symbolize their deep rejection of the goals of apartheid and separate development.

In 1987, eight years after P. W. Botha succeeded Vorster, most of the major goals of separate development as well as the philosophy of apartheid (an "outmoded concept" according to Botha) had been abandoned. Homeland independence was preferable, but not mandatory; blacks could "in principle" own land outside the homeland areas; consolidation was no longer a priority; blacks were entitled to South African citizenship. In fact, one cabinet minister, Chris Heunis, proudly announced, South

Africa should be "one country, with one citizenship and one gov-
ernment" and negotiation and consensus should be the political
style rather than unilateral decision making. Even some of the
old racist segregationist measures had been repealed, such as the
Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act, the Immorality Act, aspects
of the Separate Amenities Act and the Improper Political Inter-
ference Act. The policy of influx control had been abandoned, and
systematic black urbanization was accepted as the desired alterna-
tive. Even the so-called Coloured Labour Preference Policy for
the Western Cape was repealed in the face of inevitable black
urbanization.

   It was, however, the new tricameral constitution which became
the prize offering symbolizing the era of "reform." It was put to
a referendum for white approval only and succeeded in seducing
the majority of whites, businessmen, and some Western govern-
ments as a "step in the right direction." The blacks who were
excluded from it, and the so-called Coloureds and Indians who
were going to be the prime beneficiaries of the new constitution,
were not given the opportunity to express an opinion. The paradox
was that the new constitution, which was to herald in "reform"
and the beginning of the end of apartheid, also precipitated the
most widespread revolt the country has known — revolt from both
ends of the political spectrum. For the majority it became increas-
ingly obvious that the government was going to abandon key
aspects of apartheid and separate development without sacrificing
white domination, and for right-wing whites it became clear that
this kind of concession was the thin end of the wedge which
would eventually lead to black rule. The tricameral Parliament
not only flushed out the right-wing Conservative party of Andries
Treurnicht, it also led to the creation of the United Democratic
Front (UDF).

   Both Vorster and Botha were sensitive to right-wing electoral
threats. Vorster responded to it by simply doing nothing, or as
little as possible, to create the impression that apartheid or sepa-

rate development was being abandoned. Botha, however, had inherited a situation where it became more and more obvious that separate development and apartheid were coming unstuck. The ideological void which was beginning to develop because of the untenability of apartheid and separate development was slowly being filled by the concept of a "total onslaught," which necessitated a "total strategy" to cope with it. The whole bureaucratic edifice which had been created to achieve separate development was now going to become part of the total strategy to cope with the total onslaught. This onslaught also became the supreme justification for "reform." Thus security and domestic constitutional policy intersected and reinforced one another. Reform was necessary for security, but security was also necessary for reform. It was the historical responsibility of the dominant white minority not to lose control and thus disturb the delicate balance between the two. This, as Botha repeatedly stressed during the recent all-white election, would lead to "chaos and a communist dominated ANC [African National Congress] government." Botha won a handsome white mandate — to progressive whites he promised that security would not jeopardize reform, and to reactionary whites he could promise that reform would not jeopardize security.

The concept of a total onslaught did not materialize overnight. As minister of defense, P. W. Botha together with his then chief of staff, Magnus Malan, and chief of the army, Constand Viljoen, worked tirelessly to promote the idea.[4] If one could pinpoint a date which gave momentum to the idea of a total onslaught it would be April 25, 1974, when a coup in Lisbon led to the independence of Mozambique and Angola. For the first time, the cordon sanitaire of white minority governments north of South Africa had been broken. Rhodesia came under extreme pressure after that. Vorster's initial response was benign, almost indifferent

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[4]All of them were deeply influenced by the work of André Beaufre, *Introduction to Strategy* (London: Faber and Faber, 1965), in which he related his experiences in World War II and the war in Indo-China. Therein he propagates the idea of a "total strategy" in conditions of "total war."

to a Marxist government in Luanda and Maputo. He reiterated
the old foreign-policy principle of nonintervention and good
neighborliness and even continued with limited initiatives else-
where in Africa. Not so the Defence Department under P. W.
Botha. Almost immediately they began to redefine the security
interests of the Republic of South Africa. A year later, 1975,
South Africa had penetrated militarily deep into Angola in an
attempt to influence the composition of the government about to
take over. Soon afterward South African security personnel began
to involve themselves with Rhodesia's civil war. The principles
of good neighborliness and nonintervention had to be sacrificed
to cope with the total onslaught.

When Botha took over as prime minister and later as presi-
dent, the whole security bureaucracy became the central focus of
government administration. Not only did destabilization of neigh-
boring countries become established practice, but the defense force
was brought into townships to cope with domestic unrest on a
"continuous basis." The total onslaught became standard propa-
ganda fare on all government-controlled and supporting media.
But at the same time, it could be used to explain why apartheid
and separate development had to be abandoned and why reform
was necessary. A careful look at what "reform" is all about will
show how it inevitably had to precipitate revolt, because in the
final analysis it was simply another, new way of extending white
minority domination. The white minority was embarking on "re-
form" by looking for a way to share power without losing any.
More about this in the next lecture.

II. THE DYNAMICS OF REFORM:
CO-OPTIVE DOMINATION—SHARING POWER
WITHOUT LOSING ANY

A great deal of confusion continues to surround the idea of
reform in the present South African context. There is no point in
arguing whether change or reform has taken place or not. Of

course it has. But how do we assess its significance? There is truth in the assertion of government spokesmen that at the moment that they introduced more reforms away from the policies of apartheid and separate development than ever in the history of National party government, they experienced the severest pressure and hostility from inside and outside the country. But this is so because with the reforms the realization has crystallized that the South African state is prepared to "negotiate," "broaden democracy," "dismantle apartheid," that is, to "reform," but only on *its* terms.

The tricameral Parliament is the continuing manifestation of this kind of logic. Nothing precipitated domestic, and subsequently international, revolt against South African government reforms more than its implementation. It more than anything else demonstrated that those in control of the state were prepared to adjust, "soften," and sophisticate the entrenchment of white minority domination, but not get rid of it. It brought some of those who are not white a little closer to the center of power, while showing them how far away they are going to remain from it.

There is nothing fundamentally new in the thinking which accompanied the shift from a racist Westminster to a multiracial tricameral system of Parliament. At the heart of it was the idea that racial groups could be accommodated as predetermined political entities into a South African political system. Within the logic of apartheid‒separate development the shift was certainly new, if not all that fundamental. Until 1983 the idea was that a National party government could unilaterally partition racial groups *away* from the political center and so preserve white "self-determination," or domination. No one can sensibly deny the reality of racial or ethnic groups in South Africa, but the Nationalist party government has seized on this reality to determine that every South African individual shall participate in politics only as a member of a racial or ethnic group. If one asks why, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that it is done so that Afrikaner Nation-

alists, as the largest white ethnic group, can dominate the political system as part of a racial minority. Whatever P .W. Botha has in mind in the nature of reform, as the embodiment of the present Afrikaner Nationalist leadership, he certainly does not see an alternative where he or his party or both will not be firmly in political control of South Africa. And when he talks about negotiation, he certainly has no intention of talking himself, or his successor, out of a job.

This is the crux of the matter. On this issue, different agendas for "reform," "negotiation," "broadening democracy," and "transferring power" find their origin. That is why opposing groups very often use the same concepts with completely different meanings. As for those who dominate in South Africa, they are prepared to adjust the domination, but not to abolish it — this is their so-called bottom line for reform — whereas those who oppose domination demand the abolition of it before accepting the validity-legitimacy of reform. That is why the overwhelming response to the reform program of the government has been revolt — both domestically and internationally. The interaction between reform and revolt has trapped South Africa into a process of violent evolution which threatens to ravage its human natural resources.

A simple question needs to be answered: If the above is true, why reform at all? The conventional response to this question tends to identify various sources of pressure which in a sense "forced" the South African state to bring about certain reforms: international action, domestic political reaction, urbanization, and so on. No doubt these factors played an important part in influencing the National party government's actions, but these pressures have always been present in stronger or weaker form. In fact, Verwoerd's response to these pressures was precisely to shift the policy of apartheid to separate development. This policy shift must rank as one of the most massive attempts at social engineering of the twentieth century. It was done to maintain or preserve

"white minority self-determination" in South Africa and to free it from the accusation of racial domination. The shift from separate development to reform is preoccupied with exactly the same problem. Again and in the final analysis reform is necessary to preserve white self-determination, and again it is intended to bring about a situation "where no one group must be in a position to dominate another or others."

Still, the scope and tempo of reform cannot be adequately understood in terms of a particular factor or group of factors supposedly influencing it or intended to bring it about, for example, sanctions, armed struggle, township unrest, diplomatic pressures. To the extent that this is done, it is easy to understand why reforms thus far have been dismissed as sham, cosmetic, too little, too late, and so on. The pattern and tempo of reform has to be understood in terms of how the white minority has defined its security interests, reshaped the security system, and coordinated the whole state bureaucracy to deal with any conceivable threat to its interests. In the process, it has developed a vast empire of patronage in which a diversity of clients has a very real vested interest in maintaining the South African state. In fact, without the compliance of a substantial number of people who are not white, white minority domination would be in very real difficulty indeed. Reform is intended to extend this system of patronage and thereby strengthen the security of the state as defined by the white minority in control. Security and reform go hand in hand, but it is only if one understands the priority that security interests enjoy that some of the confusion surrounding the reform program can be cleared up. It is almost impossible to make sense of the constitutional program of the National party government if it is viewed on its own as a "rational" or "reasonable" response to pressures for reform from, say, the ANC, UDF, EPG, Inkatha, or even white liberals. However, viewed against the background of the National Security Management System developed by the Botha government, the constitutional program interlocks quite efficiently

with the security system. It is true that P .W. Botha has "re-
formed" apartheid and separate development more than any other
National party leader before him. What is not often appreciated
is how extensively he reshaped the security system of South Africa
and the South African state bureaucracy, which made it possible
to bring about those reforms but also limited him and those around
him in how far those reforms could go. A brief analysis of the
development of the security system will deepen our understanding
of the reform program and also reveal why it is almost inevitably
bound up with continuing revolt.

Before 1948, that is, before National party rule, conventional
military policy was based on the assumption that there was a clear
identity of interests between South Africa and the West. As dur-
ing the two world wars and even the Korean war, it was accepted
that in any major international conflict South Africa would side
with the West. But as apartheid became official policy and South
Africa became increasingly isolated, the defense planners began to
accept that the West was embarrassed to be seen having South
Africa as an ally. Gradually the West was depicted as hostile to
the security interests of South Africa and later even as an un-
witting ally of the expansionism effort of the Soviet Union, which
coveted South Africa as a "strategic jewel" of great importance.
Cut off from arms supply because of an international embargo
as well as facing increasing diplomatic isolation, security planners
turned to domestic resources to reshape the security system, first in
the area of armaments provision, and second in terms of man-
power. Politically this refocusing of the security system involved
a massive propaganda campaign to sell the idea of total onslaught.

Before this became the major preoccupation of the security
planners, the bureaucracy involved with security-intelligence mat-
ters went through various changes as definitions and perceptions
of security matters changed. From 1948 to 1963 there was a
Special Branch of the Police that had to focus on any internal
security threat. The Security Police came into being in 1963 under

General Hendrik van den Bergh, a close confidant of John Vorster. A Directorate of Military Intelligence was organized in 1964 and a State Security Committee had to coordinate intelligence gathering and prevent overlapping as far as possible between Military Intelligence and the Security Police. There was always an uneasy relationship between these two branches of the intelligence community, and in 1969 a Bureau for State Security (BOSS) was created under the same General van den Bergh with the following terms of reference: "(1) Investigate all matters affecting the security of the State, to correlate and evaluate the information collected and, where necessary, to inform and advise the Government, interested Government departments and other bodies in regard thereto; and (2) perform such other functions and responsibilities as may be determined from time to time."[5]

At this stage, there were actually three departments involved with security-intelligence matters: the Security Police, Military Intelligence, and the Bureau for State Security. Bureaucratic envy, one-upmanship, and overlapping remained a problem. John Vorster appointed Justice H. J. Potgieter to head a commission of inquiry. He recommended the creation of a State Security Council (SSC), which came into effect through the Security Intelligence and State Security Council Act (No. 64 of 1972) with the following terms of reference:" (1) The formulation of *national policy* and strategy in relation to the security of the Republic and the manner in which such policy or strategy shall be implemented and executed; (2) a policy to combat any particular threat to the security of the Republic (and) . . . to determine intelligence priorities." The ssc broadened the basis of interaction between professionals and politicians on security matters. It also enabled P. W. Botha, as minister of defense, to have a greater say in security matters and to try to limit the influence of General van den Bergh of BOSS, with whom he had a personally hostile relationship. Botha was also intensely jealous of any encroachment on military matters,

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[5]Government Notice 808 of 1969 (No. 86 of 1969).

and given the wide scope of BOSS's terms of reference, it was almost inevitable that clashes of interests would arise. Van den Bergh had the inside track with Prime Minister John Vorster, and therefore his view on security matters tended to prevail. In any case, Vorster gave van den Bergh almost carte blanche in this respect. Van den Bergh, together with Dr. Connie Mulder, minister of information and the most likely successor to Vorster, embarked on an aggressive campaign to sell South Africa (that is, separate development) to the international community and to Africa. For this they established a number of secret funds unaccountable to parliament. One such source was within the Department of Defence, much to the discomfort of P. W. Botha. Botha's view on the security interests of South Africa differed quite sharply from those of van den Bergh and Mulder. Instead of selling separate development to an unwilling outside world, South Africa should be preparing itself for the total onslaught.

Botha and his top generals, particularly Magnus Malan (later to become minister of defense himself), were profoundly influenced by *Introduction to Strategy,* by General André Beaufre, a French militarist who wrote about his experiences in World War II and the war in Indo-China.[6] Beaufre wrote about the need for a "total strategy" in order to cope with a "total war." This book also formed the basis of lectures at the Joint Defence College and became required reading for "red stream" staff officers in civil-military relations. Botha's thinking on the issue of total onslaught, which remains unchanged even today, is reflected in his introduction to the Department of Defence white paper tabled in parliament in 1973:

> The RSA [Republic of South Africa] is a target for international communism and its cohorts — leftists, activists, exaggerated humanism, permissiveness, materialism and related ideologies. In addition, the RSA has been singled out as a special target for the by products of their ideologies such as

[6]Beaufre, *Introduction to Strategy.*

black radicalism, exaggerated individual freedom, one-man-one-vote, and a host of other slogans employed against us on the basis of double standards.

It is against this global background that the Government is developing its policy. Traditionally, a country's policy structure comprises three basic elements — internal policy, foreign policy and defence policy. The last is determined by the preceding two, but these in turn cannot be developed properly unless they are sustained by a sound and adequate defence policy. These basic elements must therefore be closely co-ordinated and integrated; this is of vital importance, particularly in the present international climate which is typified by total strategy and which obliges us to face the onslaught of monolithic organisations which are in absolute control of all the means available to their states.[7]

From the outset, Botha's idea of a total strategy to cope with the total onslaught (shared by all his top officers) drew no distinction between defense-security interests and domestic and foreign policy. The 1977 white paper on defense, tabled in Parliament, fully developed the idea of a total national strategy. It recommended that the State Security Council should be assisted by a *permanent work committee* drawn from a dozen or more state departments. Within the ambit of a total national strategy, the white paper identified certain goals for the state. These included:

the orderly development and maintenance of the body politic;

the preservation of the identity, dignity, the right to self-determination and the integrity of all population groups;

the identification, prevention and countering of revolution, subversion and any other form of unconstitutional action;

the maintenance of a sound balance of military power in relation to neighbouring states and other states in Southern Africa;

aiming for the greatest possible measure of economic and social development, and the maximum self-sufficiency;

[7]P. W. Botha, *Republic of SA White Paper on Defence,* 1973, p. 1.

the creation of friendly relations and political and economic co-operation with the states of Southern Africa; and

planning the total national strategy at Government level for co-ordinated action between all Government departments, Government institutions and other authorities to counter the multi-dimensional onslaught against the RSA in the ideological, military, economic, social, psychological, cultural, political and diplomatic fields[8]

From 1948 to 1979, almost thirty years of National party rule, the changes in the internal security structures were the result of a long and convoluted interaction between the various security intelligence agencies in South Africa. There was confusion about goals and functions, overlapping, and interdepartmental rivalry. However, ever since P. W. Botha took over as minister of defense in 1966, he was determined to make the South African Defence Force (SADF) militarily strong and self-sufficient. He responded to the arms embargo by developing Armscor, a state-controlled arms production industry, into an impressive arms exporting industry — one of the ten largest in the world. His defense philosophy encompassed both foreign and regional policy and reached far into most aspects of domestic policy. It was Botha who masterminded the military intervention into Angola in 1974–75, thus sacrificing the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries and introducing a policy of destabilization for neighboring states. And long before he became prime minister, he argued tirelessly for a national total strategy to ward off the total onslaught. It is fascinating to speculate on what would have happened to the ideology of total strategy-total onslaught if Dr. Connie Mulder and General van den Bergh had not been eliminated from security-intelligence influence as a result of the so-called information scandal from 1974 to 1979. Until then, Botha was not considered a very serious contender for the position of prime minister. When Vorster resigned, Connie Mulder seemed

[8]*Republic of SA White Paper on Defence,* WPF-1977, p. 5.

earmarked for the position. The information scandal revealed a massive misappropriation of secret funds. Mulder and van den Bergh were deeply implicated, and even Vorster came out of it with deep political scars. Botha and his supporters moved swiftly; the caucus of the National party elected him to succeed Vorster and it was not long before Mulder, van den Bergh, and Vorster were out of the picture. For the first time, P. W. Botha was in a position to implement his security policy without any other departmental competitors or strong personalities to challenge him. He lost no time — he promised "clean administration" and a rationalization of the civil service. But the country, as well as the state bureaucracy, had to be educated on the total onslaught as well.

In the 1979 white paper on defense (the year that P. W. Botha became prime minister), it was bluntly stated that "the total onslaught as is being waged against South Africa" requires "highly co-ordinated action" if it is to be successfully counteracted.[9]

The following year, General Magnus Malan, who was soon to move from being a professional soldier to minister of defense in the Botha cabinet, spoke at the Institute for Strategic Studies at the University of Pretoria, and said:

> The design of a total onslaught, masterfully controlled by Russia, robs the intended victim of the luxury of preparation from mobilization to conventional warfare. The RSA realised the necessity of a state of continued preparedness to cope with the onslaught on its power bases. For this a total strategy is necessary, because a total onslaught against the RSA can only be overcome by a co-ordinated application of all the means at the RSA's disposal.[10]

In a special series of articles in *Paratus,* the official Defence Force magazine widely distributed to conscripts, Permanent Force mem-

[9]*Republic of SA White Paper on Defence Armaments Supply,* WPF-1979, p. 1.

[10]W. A. de M. Malan, "Die Aanslag teen SA," Institute for Strategic Studies, University of Pretoria, *Strategic Review,* Nov. 1980.

bers, and all arms of the civil service, the SADF argued the need
for "total involvement" because

> the enemies of the RSA will eventually try to deliver the *coup
> de grace* by means of a convential onslaught from one or
> more of the neighbouring states. . . . This onslaught would
> include maritime actions and be accompanied by large scale
> internal unrest. The USSR is for this reason using the so-
> called threat that South Africa's military potential holds for
> its neighbouring states as an excuse to supply huge quantities
> of arms to those countries. This build up also includes the
> gradual increase in involvement by Soviet-bloc military per-
> sonnel as well as the development of those countries' infra-
> structure for war.[11]

Notice again how the description of the total onslaught-total
strategy interaction involves coordinated action in the areas of
international, regional, and domestic policy. The period 1979-87
saw the militarization of the South African society on an un-
precendented scale. The 1982 Defence Department white paper
sets, as one of the goals in the SADF, the policy of militarizing the
entire society. "It is policy that all population groups be involved
in defending the RSA. This means the representation of all popu-
lation groups, in the SADF, in other words, a Defence Force of the
People for the People."[12]

There already existed an Indian and Cape Coloured Corps
and the idea was to extablish battalions in each of the so-called
National States. There is no compulsory conscription for those
who are not white, but the SADF has no difficulty in recruiting
more than the required volunteers that it can accommodate. It is
important to realize that the "total involvement" of other popula-
tion groups in the defense of the Republic of South Africa also
serves as a powerful rationale for "dismantling apartheid" and
legitimizing "reform."

[11]"Total Involvement," *Paratus* 33, no. 5 (May 1982): 22.

[12]*White Paper on Defence and Armanent Supply*, WPM-1982, p. 2.

One of the first things Botha did when he became prime minister was to reduce the number of cabinet committees and to coordinate their agendas. One of them, the State Security Council, was elevated into a position of special prominence. It enjoyed statutory recognition, and Botha, as prime minister, was its chairman. In terms of its scope of activities a National Security Management System (NSMS) was adoped on August 16, 1979. The NSMS has created a formidable apparatus, drawing together officials and politicians who wield extraordinary power and influence in South Africa. Not only has it effected a very high degree of coordination in the civil service, it has also induced a much higher degree of efficiency in coping with perceived security threats and has infused in a new generation of public servants and other beneficiaries of state patronage an awareness of total onslaught and a commitment to total strategy as a means of coping with it.

The NSMS is deployed on the central, regional, and local level of state administration. On the central level of admistration there are five major components:

1.   The *cabinet* together with the president forms the link between political and security interests.

2.   The *state security council* has the state president (formerly the prime minister) as chairman and includes the senior minister in the cabinent, the ministers of foreign affairs, defense, justice, and police as well as the director of the National Intelligence Service (NIS has replaced BOSS), the chief of the SADF, the commissioner of the South African Police, the secretary of foreign affairs, and the secetary of justice. Additional members can be co-opted as circumstances may repuire. The SSC meets every fortnight before the cabinet and overviews security and intelligence matters. The state president then reports to the caninet on such matters.

3. A *permanent working committee* consists of the heads of departments represented on the SSC as well as the chairmen of the other cabinet committees. Its functions are to meet every fortnight before the SSC meets to discuss the agenda of the SSC and to make recommendations on advice of the ssc to the cabinet.

4. The *Secretariat of the SSC* consists entirely of civil servants (approximately l00), who serve there either permanently or on secondment. The representation from government departments is: 11 percent Foreign Affairs; 1 percent Prison Services, 11 percent Security Police, 5 percent Railway Police, 16 percent SADF, and 56 percent NIS (that is, 89 percent of the representation comes from security-intelligence agencies). The Secretariat has four branches:

> The *Administrative Branch,* whose functions are self-evident
>
> The *National Intelligence Interpretation Branch,* which provides intelligence reports and interprets national intelligence
>
> The *Strategic Communication Branch,* whose main task is to devise strategies to counteract negative propaganda and to promote positive propaganda
>
> The *Strategy Branch,* which formulates total strategies and coordinates policies of interdepartmental committees.

5. *Interdepartmental Committees.* The Departments involved are Manpower, Security Services, Civil Defence, Transport, National Supplies and Resources, Government Funding, National Economy, Telecommunications and Electrical Power Supply, Service and Technology, Community Services, Culture, and Political Affairs. These interdepartmental committees are the key to the Strategy Branch of the Secretariat. They provide departmental strategies which

the Strategy Branch of the Secretariat coordinates into a total strategy to deal with an overall security threat.

On the regional level of administration there are twelve Joint Management Centres (JMCs) located conveniently at the twelve SADF command headquarters in Durban, Kimberley, Pretoria, Port Elizabeth, Bloemfontein, Oudtshoorn, Walvis Bay, Johannesburg, Cape Town, Potchefstroom, Pietersburg, Nelspruit. Eventually it is intended to let them correspond to the nine economic development regions that have been identified. Each JMC consists of between forty and sixty officials drawn from government departments with an "interest in the activities of the JMC," and each JMC has three standing committees.[13]

A *Joint Intelligence Standing Committee* (GIK) evaluates intelligence reports in the region.

A *Constitutional, Economic and Social Standing Committee* (SEMKOM) formulates joint strategies on a regional level to counteract security threats identified by the GIK.

A *Communications Standing Committee* (KOMKOM) disseminates accurate information (propaganda) or disinforms opponents.

(Notice how the three standing committees dovetail in terms of functions on a *regional* level with the functions of the three branches of the Secretariat on the *central* level.)

Each JMC has an executive which consists of the chairman of the JMC (in all cases so far it is a brigadier of the SADF or the South African Police, SAP) and the chairman of the three standing Committees.

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[13]Much of the detailed information on the structure of the NSMS depends on the unpublished thesis for a master's degree in political science by J. Selfe, "The Total Onslaught and the Total Strategy," University of Cape Town, 1986, chapter 111.

The formal terms of reference of the JMCs are "to ensure the necessary co-ordination on security matters at regional and local levels through the Departments concerned," but as General Piet van der Westhuizen, current secretary-general of the SSC put it, the JMCs are the eyes and ears of the NSMS and they monitor the implementation of total strategies. Their prime objective is "the lowering of the revolutionary climate; the prevention/defusing of unrest, and combatting terrorism and other revolutionary actions."[14]

The JMCs bring together in one organization all the top officials in the respective regions and they also control formidable executive powers. The total strategy applied to "external onslaught" at least provides the civil service and army with the fiction that this is in the interest of all South Africans and is therefore "nonpolitical action." However, countering the "internal onslaught" or "lowering the revolutionary climate" brings the organs of state into direct political controversy, which destroys any pretense at political neutrality. The South African state becomes both the agent for "reform" to meet the onslaught as well as the source of counterrevolutionary action to undermine it.

If those who are supposed to be the beneficiaries of reform are also part of the total onslaught, it is not difficult to see how reform and revolt are inextricably linked to one another.

On the local level of administration there are 60 *sub-management centers* corresponding roughly to the 57 regional services councils that have been delimited and a further 350 *mini management centers* covering most of the towns of the RSA. It is on the local level of the NSMS administration where civilians become involved in the total strategy for the first time. Leading local personalities or office-bearers of local interest groups are co-opted into these management centers and their activities coordinated into strategies defined by the JMCs at the regional and professional level of the NSMS. Activities at the local level can

[14]General P. van der Westhuizen, *Die Burger*, May 27, 1986.

cover a wide range of activities which relate to security and intelligence matters: civil defense, emergency action, antiterrorist training, first aid, distress relief action, and so on.

In tracing how the security interests of the Republic of South Africa as defined by those in control of the state have changed over time, one is able to see how it became possible to abandon key aspects of apartheid–separate development in favor of a total onslaught-total strategy alternative. The National party government under P. W. Botha shifted from proactively motivating whites in favor of apartheid–separate development, as was the case under Malan, Strydom, Verwoerd, and Vorster, to reactively motivating them against the total onslaught. That is why the values of security and stability have begun to lose their instrumental character and have become ends in themselves. The NSMS of the P. W. Botha era provides the policy framework within which the resources of the South African state are organized in a total strategy to combat "the threat."

Any person or movement that questions the state's perceptions of "the threat" is defined as part of it, and similarly, those who resist being co-opted into the total strategy, become defined as its legitimate targets. It is an ideology with a built-in self-fulfilling logic. As long as the right of those who define "the onslaught" and "manage the strategy" is not questioned or threatened, they will tolerate, even encourage "reform," the "broadening of democracy," and "negotiation." The moment it is questioned, even by implication, as happened during the visits of the EPG and Sir Geoffrey Howe, National party government spokesmen use concepts such as "suicide," "surrender," "chaos," "disintegration," to conjure up alternative possibilities to their own continued control. The propaganda import is obvious — if a future strategy could lead to "suicide," or some apocalyptic equivalent, the continued costs of the present one remain bearable. Divergent, even hostile interest groups find themselves somehow trapped into

arguing within this propaganda framework — from right-wing racists to businessmen — even to some liberal newspaper editors. The morality and logic which argues that the fight for survival respects no rules is perfectly compatible with the argument "better the devil you know, than the one you don't." It is in this ideological context that the South African state's international, regional, and domestic policies have to be understood. Actions of the government which "normally" don't make sense become coherent — for example, the raid on neighboring territories during the EPG visit and while Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher were fighting desperate rearguard actions against sanctions. The EPG, Reagan, Thatcher, and Howe all came with the same message: dismantle apartheid, release political prisoners, unban organizations, and negotiate. The obvious question of what was to be negotiated once apartheid had been dismantled was answered by P. W. Botha at the 1986 Transvaal Congress of the National party when he accused "the outside world of confusing reform with surrender." Similarly, the South African state's regional policy does not hesitate to defy convention, use subterfuge, lies, and uncomplicated force if it serves the total strategy in its fight against the onslaught.

The NSMS is the policy which gives effect to the ideology of total strategy versus total onslaught. It also destroys any pretense at neutrality or nonpartisanship. The idea of a neutral civil service loyally and disinterestedly serving whichever government happened to be in power was still a strong tradition when the National party took over in 1948. However, as Afrikaner nationalism consolidated itself and the civil service became the major channel of Afrikaner economic mobility, the partisan nature of the state bureaucracy became increasingly evident. Furthermore, new and vast bureaucracies were created in order to give effect to what was essentially a party political doctrine, that is, apartheid and separate development. With the implementation of a total strategy, which draws on "all the available resources" to meet the

onslaught, no competing and, especially, contradictory ideologies or political programs can be tolerated. Thus, P. W. Botha, by redefining the security interests of the South African state, has given it a coherence and unity of purpose which it has not had before; it has developed a common ideology, a common set of goals and strategies, and an overall policy in terms of which to implement them. Every state structure, including Parliament, homeland governments, independent states and neighboring countries, are subservient to the goals and logic of the total strategy. Even reform.

On the domestic front, the crisp issue of reform is how to jettison apartheid–separate development without losing control and still mobilize enough support for the total strategy. Constitutionally the response has been a massive and sustained erosion of accountable politics in favor of co-optive decision making. At the central and key points, the control the white minority has ensures that its will cannot be challenged by popular rejection. The quid pro quo for co-optive control has been to multiracialize political participation. As the 1986 white paper on defense made clear, whites alone cannot implement the total strategy. The other population groups have to make their contribution as well. At present the South African state is planning to regulate this contribution in the constitutional area. It appears that what the leaders have in mind is a multiracial constitution making provision for the group representation of homeland, urban, and rural blacks, as well as Coloureds, Asians, and whites, with the white minority at the apex of control.

Those in control have no objections to popular elections, provided they occur within structures determined by them and provided that at the vital areas of decision making no headcount will determine the outcome where the government's own representation is in the minority. This pattern of representation is evident in the tricameral Parliament, the regional services councils, the members of the executive council (MECS) of the former pro-

vincial councils, and, in the latest development, the National
Council, which provides for elected blacks outside the homeland
and independent territories. The overall structure could very well
be a quasi-representative multiracial autocracy with the white
minority in firm control over political decision making and na-
tional security. For propaganda purposes it will be presented as
a government of national unity — the South African people's
response to the total onslaught. While conceding that it may not
be perfect, South Africa is responding in a unique way to a unique
problem, and it is preferable to what would happen under a
"one-man-one-vote ANC and Communist controlled State."

The viability of this system of co-optive domination will
depend primarily on two things: the South African state's con-
tinuing power of patronage and a sufficient degree of cooperation
from other population groups. It is important to realize that
co-optive domination does not depend on legitimacy and/or
majority support to work (too often people tend to think that
by demonstrating the illegitimacy of a regime they have also pre-
dicted its collapse); it simply needs enough people to participate
in it. This is where the battle is raging at its fiercest in urban
black communities. The South African state is determined to
find "good," "responsible," "peace-loving" blacks, and townships
are torn between cooperating and rejecting any form of collabora-
tion. Almost every aspect of black community life has become
politicized, so that everyday normal activities and issues become
topics of heated debate. It appears to be slowly crystallizing into
an ideological division between a multiracial autocracy versus a
nonracial or "socialist" democracy. By defining those who argue
or struggle for a popular democracy based on the free association
of individuals as subversive, the South African state has brought
the total onslaught into the domestic arena. Its own counter-
strategy is to offer multiracial patronage as part and parcel of its
"reform" program. That is why the state's reform program has

to be accompanied by a massive extension of coercion or repression. For the state to allow genuine accountability politics, it would have to face the risk of popular rejection of its whole total strategy and eventually of the position of minority domination for the whites. As P. W. Botha has so bluntly stated to the British foreign minister: "this could be political suicide."

The constitutional reform package which thus dovetails with the NSMS depends on co-optive participation at various levels of civilian government, At the *central level,* it includes *(a)* a confederation of states between South Africa and the TBVC countries (Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, and Ciskei); *(b)* a National Council consisting of nine black representatives elected in each of the nine economic regions delimited by the state: representatives from the homeland governments as well as the state president, a few cabinet ministers and nine others nominated by the state president; and *(c)* a tricameral Parliament for whites, Coloureds, and Asians. At the *regional level* it includes: *(a)* MECs of the former Provincial Council; *(b)* nine electoral divisions for blacks from the nine economic development areas; and *(c)* homeland areas. At the *local level* it includes: *(a)* regional service councils; *(b)* local governments; and *(c)* management committees.

At each level an element of the NSMS is at hand to coordinate security strategies with political reform programs. The state is determined to channel all forms of political participation into these predetermined co-optive structures and then to "negotiate" further constitutional developments. Any dissent that tries to manifest itself outside of these structures is treated as an unwitting or witting agent of the total onslaught and can expect the full force of the state's repressive measures to act against it. It is against this background that one has to understand the structures, organizations, and strategies for resistance, opposition, or revolt and assess their chances of success. This is what the final lecture is all about.

III. THE DYNAMICS OF REFORM:
PATTERNS OF RESISTANCE AND REVOLT

On July 21, 1985, P. W. Botha announced a state of emergency which has twice been renewed and endures to the present. In terms of the proclamation, extraordinary powers were conferred on officers of the security forces to deal with the unrest in the townships. This was preceded by a decision of the state to use the SADF on a continuous basis to assist the SAP to cope with internal unrest. The first large-scale operation of this kind was in Sebokeng in August 1984. Since then, this kind of operation has become commonplace. The SAP has also been supplemented by the introduction of "kitskonstables" (literally, "instant constables") into the townships — police recruits with minimum training over a three-month period who are given sjamboks (whips) and guns and who patrol urban black communities. The state has used "black vigilante" groups to assist it in imposing coercive control. In fact, South Africa has had the most extensive imposition of repressive control since Union in 1910. Six months after the first announcement of a state of emergency, it was estimated that about 7,500 people had been detained or arrested. By mid-1986 detentions or arrests were estimated to be in the region of 12,000. The numbers have decreased significantly since then and are now considered to be about 1,500. Included in this 1,500 are a vast number of community leaders and some prisoners awaiting trial. It is difficult to be exact because the state does not regard it to be in the "public interest" to make this kind of information available.

The manner in which the state of emergency was implemented and the incidents of unrest, mob violence, and massive funerals made South Africa prime-time viewing on most of the television stations of the world. As a news item South Africa was one of the ten most popular news items of 1985 and 1986.[15] The state

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[15]*World Press Review,* February 1987, p. 8.

soon put a stop to this by forbidding entry into townships to television crews (particularly foreign ones) and laying down stringent conditions for reporting on unrest. It set up its own unrest information liaison structure, which carefully monitored news on the events of each day. Soon South Africa was off the front pages and editorial columns of newspapers, and particularly inside South Africa and for whites the impression was created that "normality" had returned and that everything was under control.

But there was a time during the height of the revolt and resistance when extraordinary and extravagant claims were being made about the imminence of the South African state's collapse. Confident predictions about the efficacy of sanctions, boycotts, strikes, liberated zones, and mass mobilization were commonplace. This kind of euphoria about the imminence of radical change has all but disappeared, but at its height, a climate existed in which there was a great deal of instant postapartheid scenario building. This inevitably focused attention on opposition movements and strategies and their relative significance in the widespread revolt that took place. In looking at the patterns of resistance and revolt, it is useful to keep the distinction between movements and strategies, if only for the obvious reason that different movements, parties, and organizations may have different goals and agendas for change but share the same strategies or, conversely, may differ on strategies but share the same goals.

MOVEMENTS

THE UNITED DEMOCRATIC FRONT

In considering the interaction between reform and revolt, it is appropriate to begin with the UDF, not because it is the oldest opposition movement (it is not) or necessarily the first to respond to the state's reform proposals, but because the UDF managed to capture the highground in mobilizing domestic resistance against the implementation of the new tricameral constitution. In doing so, it highlighted the fundamental cleavages between

parliamentary and extra-parliamentary politics and posed a crisis of legitimacy for all individuals or organizations who participated in state-created constitutional structures. The issue of black exclusion from the new tricameral constitution was effectively seized on to question the relevance of any participation in such structures and to highlight the co-optive nature of the state's constitutional program. The UDF was careful never to elevate the issue of nonparticipation into an inflexible principle, but at the same time it very actively encouraged people not to participate in, especially, tricameral politics for the present, while challenging those who did to demonstrate the relevance of such actions. This approach was so effective that it made a mockery of the first so-called Coloured and Indian elections, which registered a very low overall poll and presented those who were elected with an enduring crisis of credibility.

The UDF is not a monolithic party or organization but a front with approximately six hundred affiliates distributed across the country. Its initial objective was mass mobilization against tricameral politics, and this inevitably meant a heavy emphasis on protest politics. This objective was eventually broadened to include other areas of domestic politics. The diversity of organizations belonging to it, as well as the rapidity with which its membership increased, made it difficult to judge it in terms of a single policy or agenda. Gradually, however, "critical issues" emerged which became identified with a UDF position: the Freedom Charter, sanctions, nonracialism, and a very sympathetic stance toward the ANC, although the UDF was insistent that it was not an ANC front and was committed to nonviolent opposition. Nevertheless, it still campaigns vigorously for the unbanning of political organizations, such as the ANC, and for the release of political prisoners. There is no doubt that the effectiveness of the mass mobilization of the UDF managed to achieve two things which characterized the nature of the revolt that accompanied reform: first, it located the revolt as a struggle between an extra-

parliamentary executive (that is, state president plus ssc plus security forces) and extra-parliamentary opposition groups, and second, it forced the South African state to propagandize the ANC as the vanguard of the total onslaught.

THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS

The history of the ANC is well recorded in numerous publications.[16] It is the oldest and arguably the largest mass liberation movement of South Africa. For about two and a half decades it has been banned and its leadership has been in exile or in prison, but there can be no doubt that it exerts a major influence on the quality and extent of resistance politics to the South African state. In fact, it is not possible adequately to understand the relationship between reform and revolt without giving due recognition to the strategic position which the ANC occupies in this relationship. Two reasons can be given for this: first, the ANC is the oldest, broadest based liberation movement with a fairly comprehensive strategy and goal for the liberation of South Africa; and second, the South African state has targeted the ANC as its major opponent. The ANC and what it stands for, as well as its associates, epitomize the total onslaught for the South African state and is therefore the major rationale for the total strategy, which in turn legitimizes reform.

During June 16–23, 1985, there was a Second National Consultative Conference of the ANC in Lusaka. From its proceedings as documented in committee reports, a comprehensive picture of the ANC structures, code of conduct, strategies, tactics, and membership emerges. Essentially, it sees itself as a broadly based revolutionary movement with the following goals:

1. To strive to unite the people of South Africa, the Africans in particular, for the objective of the immediate seizure of

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[16]A recent overview of the present state of the ANC as an organization can be found in T. Lodge, "State of Exile: The African National Congress of SA, 1976-1986," *Third World Quarterly,* 1987, pp. 1-27.

power from the racist colonial regime and its transfer to the people of South Africa as a whole.

2. To further strengthen the People's Army into a force capable of defeating the enemy and defending the gains of the revolution.

3. To create a united, non-racial and democratic South Africa based on the principles of the Freedom Charter.

4. To support the cause of National Liberation, world peace and the right to independence of nations of Africa and the rest of the world.[17]

The strategies and tactics to achieve these aims and objectives are spelled out in a separate report and include "a people's war or armed struggle, mass internal mobilization, setting up underground structures and international isolation."[18] These different strategies are seen to be intimately linked and dependent on one another for their respective degrees of success. The following descriptions of the "People's War" illustrate this point very clearly:

> A people's war is fought by the people with arms and all other forms and methods of struggle. Without the organized support of the people, armed struggle is in danger of being isolated and strangled. The enemy attempts to isolate us by launching campaigns to win the "hearts and minds" of the people — of our people, the oppressed and suffering workers and peasants. To defeat the enemy we must involve the entire people in the National Democratic Revolution.[19]

> The armed struggle must be based on, and grow out of, mass political support and must eventually involve all our people. All military activities must at every stage be guided and determined by the need to generate political mobilization, organisa-

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[17]"Report of Commission on National Structures, Constitutional Guidelines, and Codes of Conduct," ANC National Consultative Conference, June 1985, p. 6.

[18]"Commission on Cadre Policy, Political and Ideological Work, Internal Commission Report, Commission on Strategy and Tactics," ANC National Consultative Conference, June 1985.

[19]"Report of Commission on National Structures," p. 15.

tion and resistance, with the aim of progressively weakening
the enemy's grip on his reins of political, economic, social and
military power, by a combination of political and military
action. The forms of political and military activities and the
ways these activities relate to one another, go through different
phases as the situation changes. It is therefore vital to have
under continuous survey the changing tactical relationships
between these two inter-dependent factors in our struggle and
the place which political and military actions (in the narrow
sense) occupy in each phase, both nationally and within each
of our main regions.[20]

Given the encompassing nature of the ANC strategies, it is in-
evitable that it will become involved in any significant internal
resistance and revolt and that ANC supporters-members will either
openly or clandestinely be active across a wide spectrum of move-
ments, fronts, organizations, and activities. That is why strikes,
consumer and school boycotts, protest meetings, and the like
initiated by other organizations but with the same issues at stake
will enjoy ANC support and even active participation. In this
sense, it sometimes becomes irrelevant whether the UDF is an ANC
front or not. Oliver Tambo, the ANC president, makes this quite
clear when he says:

> What the UDF has been doing is part of this growing resistance
> to the Apartheid system, the struggle to bring about a new
> order. We are happy with that. . . . I think the UDF represents
> the success of our appeals to our people to be organized and
> to unite in action. That doesn't make them ANC, but they have
> got to fight the struggle. The ANC is with them. The ANC is
> the people, not in terms of formations, branches and regional
> organisations, but it's with them and its political line is public,
> it is clear.[21]

The same applies to any other single-purpose organization pursu-
ing a line of action that falls within the ANC'S broad definition

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[20]"Commission on Cadre Policy," p. 12.

[21]Interview with Oliver Tambo by Margaret A Novicki, *Africa Report,* July-
August 1985, pp. 34 and 35.

of the struggle, whether it be the Black Sash, the End Conscription Campaign (ECC) , a trade union, a church, or even the Progressive Federal Party (PFP). This is an important point to grasp because by choosing the ANC as its prime opponent the South African state, by implication, criminalizes or demonizes any opposition group or strategy whose actions correspond with goals or strategies of the ANC. In fact, given the goals and strategies of the South African state and the ANC, respectively, it is quite evident that they define each other as the prime targets of each other's total strategies. The total strategy of the South African state is the NSMS and reform versus the total strategy of the ANC, which is the National Democratic Revolution for a liberated South Africa. Each strategy's final objective is the destruction of the other. That is why reform and revolt will continue to interact with one another until this cycle is somehow broken.

An important consequence of the South African state's targeting the ANC as its major opponent is that it can propagandize against any other party or organization which shares values in common with ANC objectives. Thus one man, one vote; nonracial democracy; freedom of association; unbanning of organizations; the rule of law; and the civil liberties of the individual as opposed to the "rights of the group" are values which immediately make a party or organization who campaigns for them suspect as either "a useful idiot" or willing collaborators of the ANC. At the same time, the state can select those aspects of ANC strategy or structure which it regards as the most useful for demonizing purposes and through guilt by association tar any other opposition grouping with the same brush. "Terrorism," "violence," and "communism" are the three most common labels. It is particularly in the white political arena where this rather crude tactic is very effective. A 1985 Human Science Research Council (HSRC) survey of white voters indicated that 85 percent were in favor of "negotiating with blacks," and only 3.6 percent of respondents believed that

negotiations should be held with the ANC.[22] White voters are not only conditioned to think that negotiation *need not* include the ANC but are constantly brainwashed to believe that any negotiations with the ANC should be avoided at all costs. The ANC is officially presented in South Africa as a gang of incorrigible villains and demons that must be eliminated and with which there should be no negotiations. This approach by the South African state more than anything else lies at the root of its inability to attract credible leaders into any of its co-optive structures in the center, such as the tricameral Parliament and the National Council. Any other party or organization that petitions for the unbanning of the ANC and negotiating with it is then rubbished as wanting to hobnob with "terrorists" and "communists."

OTHER NONPARTICIPATIVE OPPOSITION

A useful distinction to be made in discussing groups in opposition to the state is between those who, like the UDF and ANC, either as a matter of deliberate policy or through convention, do not participate in the constitutional structures sanctioned by the South African state and those who do. Other nonparticipative opposition groups would, for example, be:

> *PAC, BC, National Forum, NEUM.* The Pan African Congress, the Black Conservatives, and the New Unity Movement fall outside the ANC support group and are also regarded as "non-Charterist" organizations (that is, do not subscribe to or support or adopt the Freedom Charter accepted by those who attended the 1955 Kliptown Congress of the People). Although members and/or supporters of these organizations differ strategically and in certain respects ideologically from the ANC they have in many cases felt the same impact of state repression and have also been active across a wide front in revolt against state reforms. The ANC is very sensitive to its

[22]W. Van Vuuren, "The Reaction Back Home," *UWC* [*University of the Western Cape*] *News,* September 1982, p. 8.

pole position in the liberation struggle being questioned and
very often reacts sharply to the perceived role of these group-
ings in regional and community politics. Accusations of
"diluting and struggle," "divisiveness," and "undermining
unity of purpose" often reflect an underlying rivalry and a
battle for hegemony in opposition. The South African state
is quick to exploit these differences when and wherever it suits
it to "divide and rule" or to fragment opposition to its policy
and programs.

The Churches. A self-evident distinction can be drawn
between an established church's position in the revolt in terms
whether its membership is predominantly black or white. To
the extent that its membership is predominantly black, the
church will be drawn deeper into the revolt against the state's
reforms or repression. An inevitable reason for this is that the
church forms a vital institutional base for community orga-
nization and communication. As the state systematically nar-
rowed down avenues of legitimate dissent so the churches
became more and more involved in dealing with reaction to
and consequences of community repression. Funerals became
emotional and symbolic occasions for demonstrating not only
community grief but also solidarity and determination to
continue resistance. The state again acted against this by for-
bidding television crews to cover funerals and by severely
restricting attendance as well as what could and could not be
said. A number of clergy have been detained, even tortured,
during the state of emergency. Quite distinct from any theo-
logical considerations, the church as a social institution is
going through a fundamental redefinition of its role in the
"total strategy." Recently the Free State Synod of the Dutch
Reformed Church adopted a resolution forbidding discussions
between its office-bearers and the ANC. At the same time,
Bishop Desmond Tutu led a delegation to Lusaka precisely
for such discussions.

The Press-Media. Again a distinction can be drawn between so-called "established" press and "alternative" press. The latter is openly partisan to nonparticipative extra-parliamentary opposition and consequently a very obvious target of state action. Recently yet another series of stringent press censorship measures was announced, giving the state's representatives carte blanche to decide whether a particular publication was assisting or contributing to a revolutionary climate. The "established" press can (broadly speaking) be divided into those publications that are supportive of government and those that are opposed, although opposition can vary from being mild to principled. None of them would take the same risk as "alternative" newspapers in identifying with a particular non-participative extra-parliamentary group. However, despite crippling restrictions on reporting on the unrest and state of emergency, some of them have managed to expose state irregularities and excesses. They remain under continued threat of state action as long as they nudge against the official threshold of tolerance. At the same time there are managers and editors of the "opposition press" who, although they feel strongly about certain principles such as freedom of the press and rule of law, are not all that averse to accepting the "reality" of the total onslaught and the need for a total strategy.

PARTICIPATIVE OPPOSITION

When discussing participative opposition the issue is not only participation in the political structures sanctioned by the state (for example, Parliament, legislative assemblies, regional services councils, community councils) but also other structures regarded by the state to be "constitutional" (trade unions, schools, universities). The issue of participative opposition is relevant to the extent that groups, parties, or movements regard participation in those structures as strategically significant in pursuing their goals. The issue of participation in particularly political structures has

created a great deal of tension and even open hostility between organizations and movements opposed to the state, and needless to say these divisions have been systematically exploited by the state to keep fragmentation and disunity to its total strategy alive.

Parliamentary Opposition. If Parliament as a base for not only opposing those in power but unseating them is to be taken seriously, then it is most likely to be a white right-wing political party. The fact that the dominant party can always undercut such a threat by making concessions to white fears and prejudices makes this an unlikely prospect. The tricameral Parliament is tailormade for white right-wing opposition. The "revolt from the right" is often overlooked when the dynamics of reform and revolt are considered. Apart from the fact that right-wing views are strategically well represented throughout the state bureaucracy, particularly in the security structures, and are intimately involved in the deployment of the total strategy, Parliament provides the most prominent public forum for promoting right-wing views. To the extent that the National party as the dominant party wishes to promote reform, but at the same time demonizes the most important organizations and movements representing blacks who are supposed to be the prime beneficiaries of reform, the right-wing can exploit any "new reform measures," no matter how timid or incremental, as a sell-out or capitulation of white interest. The irony of the reform program as part of the total strategy is that it forces the National party government into the extra-parliamentary arena to make it work. It is not sufficient to induce Coloureds and Indians into Parliament, it is necessary to persuade blacks onto the "reform structures" created by the state. M. G. Buthelezi sums this dilemma up concisely:

> On the level of constitutional development, the State President can make no gains from doing things which blacks reject. He has to involve blacks in constitutional development. We as black leaders have the ultimate weapon of veto right over what the State President can achieve. He can

blunder without us, but he cannot succeed without us. The next two to three years is going to be a crucial time in which massive endeavours should be made to stop the State. President establishing political circuses in which he can be the ringmaster.[23]

On the other hand, if the state president moves too rapidly to do things which "blacks do not reject" in the extra-parliamentary terrain, it will run up against what whites are not prepared to accept in the parliamentary terrain. These are the inevitable constraints within which white party politics is forced to play itself out and which limit the tempo and quality of "constitutional" change. That is why white opposition from the left in Parliament is so vulnerable. The moment it identifies too strongly with a nonracial democracy; freedom of association; one man, one vote, it is defined as part of the total onslaught and subjected to the same propaganda onslaught reserved for the ANC. At the same time, it is in no position to compete with those to the right of it in promising "white security." Consequently, "left" participative opposition of whites in Parliament can have strategic but not substantive significance, that is, it cannot substantially threaten any dominant party in the House of Assembly. Strategically it can enter into an alliance or coalition with other parliamentary or extra-parliamentary opposition groups, but at the increased risk of electoral vulnerability. However, if such opposition has relinquished any designs on "going for power," it can have a significant protesting role. In this sense it has played a part in the dynamic between reform and revolt by focusing on arbitrary state action during the different states of emergency.

What is true for white "left" opposition in Parliament is generally true for those parties in the other two chambers of the tricameral Parliament. An additional strategic significance, however, is that they can, in specific cases, constitutionally frustrate the plans of the dominant white party in Parliament. The latest

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[23]M. G. Buthelezi, *Clarion Call* (Inkatha Institute, 1987), vol. 2, p. 3.

example is the resignation from the cabinet of the Labour party leader Alan Hendrickse and his declared intention to oppose a change of the constitution unless certain concessions come from the government. So far this kind of confrontationist horse trading has been rare, but it is certainly a strategic advantage available to those who participate in this manner. In the absence of its being used regularly and effectively, those who participate are under continuous pressure to "deliver the goods" and have to cope with a credibility crisis from those who reject participative opposition.

Extra-parliamentary Opposition. There is little doubt that Inkatha, a predominantly Zulu-based movement which professes a paid-up membership of more than one and a half million and is led by M. G. Buthelezi, occupies a strategically important position in the dynamic between reform and revolt. Its pattern of participative opposition thus far has consistently frustrated the co-optive designs of the state, but at the same time, this has also frustrated the scope of the ANC's National Democratic Revolution. At the height of the revolt in 1985–86, an intensely hostile relationship existed between the UDF-ANC and Inkatha, and each accused the other of murder and bloodshed. There is clear evidence of community violence between Inkatha and the UDF in a number of townships in Natal. Buthelezi differs strongly with the UDF-ANC on a number of areas of strategy and principle. Clearly committed to a system of free enterprise, he opposes sanctions actively, domestically and abroad, is dismissive of the armed struggle, and did not participate in the protests and mass mobilization led by the UDF. For this, he has been depicted as an "enemy of the struggle," a "collaborator and sell out" by the ANC and other nonparticipative opposition groups.

Undoubtedly Inkatha-Buthelezi's national support suffered from the onset of constitutional reform. The tricameral Parliament not only precipitated mass mobilization against it, but brought the ANC into prominence as the flagship of revolt and

raised the issue of participative opposition on all levels. But Buthelezi's support in Natal remains formidable, and it is quite obvious that he can fundamentally affect the state's latest co-optive constitutional designs by deciding to participate or not. He is consistently using the threat of participation-nonparticipation as a bargaining chip for concessions from the state. For example:

> The State President will fail utterly if he follows a course of events in which he gives political roles to good boys and expects them to do an impossible job. I would negotiate with the State President tomorrow if the negotiating agenda would include the scrapping of the tricameral Parliament and would, for instance, make it possible for me to table a final version of the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba constitutional proposals. Obviously, black democracy must be unshackled to give black negotiators the prospects of carrying blacks with them. The only blacks worth negotiating with are blacks who would, in fact, increase their own power bases through negotiations. Of what value would I be to Mr. P. W. Botha, to black South Africa and South Africa as a whole, if I was by now located in the South African political rubbish heap because I had prematurely involved myself in discussions with the State President? [24]

If the state president "is thinking of the kind of future in which whites remain the final decision makers over all matters which add up to establishing domestic and foreign policy" Buthelezi declares himself not available.[25] In short, if the state is prepared to negotiate away white domination, he is on board. If not, he is prepared to wait. Given the fact that protecting white domination is the raison d'être of the total strategy, Butheleti's detractors accuse him of waiting in comfort, but both he and his detractors fail to convince each other about the effectiveness of their competing strategies.

[24]Ibid., p. 3.
[25]Ibid p. 5.

The kind of participative opposition which Inkatha represents, certainly differs from that of the nonparticipative kind on more levels than strategy and principle alone. Inkatha is essentially a constituency organization that can function legally. The leadership is thus more immediately accountable, and because it does cooperate in administering part of the state structure, it is involved in dispensing reward and patronage. This alone introduces constraints and vested interests which do not affect the quality of leadership of nonparticipative organizations. Buthelezi epitomizes the trials and tribulations of this kind of participative opposition, which is also the fate, to a lesser extent, of other homeland leaders who do not have his scope and depth of support.

Trade Unions. South African trade unionism is one of the best-documented developments of recent years.[26] Black unionism has made spectacular advances. One of the central characteristics of this development is the extent to which unions have used the industrial machinery created by the state to pursue goals unintended by those who set up the structures. Given the manner in which the state cut off other legitimate channels of political dissent, it was almost inevitable that the unions would begin to experience a "political overload." Because of this, trade unionism is an inherent part of the dynamic between reform and revolt. Although unions may differ on their affiliation-support for the UDF-ANC and whether they are "charterist" or "workerist," all of them are in some way or other part of the struggle for liberation. Consequently, the state has been particularly aggressive, even brutal, in the actions it has taken against unions. Many leaders have also been detained, tortured, and in some cases killed in mysterious circumstances.

Because of their participative nature, the unions are constitutional and legal and have opportunities denied to banned or other nonparticipative organizations and movements. There is no doubt

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[26]For a comprehensive recent publication, see Steven Freedman, *Building Tomorrow Today* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1987).

that their experience in bargaining, organizing, and disciplining membership has increased dramatically as industrial disputes have multiplied in recent years. An unknown factor is the extent to which unions will retain their independence when and if conditions of freedom of organization and association exist in South Africa. Will they become purely functional labor organizations or be subsumed under broader political movements? This is not purely an academic question, because this issue also lies at the heart of some unions' resistance to becoming too "involved in politics" or losing their independence to the hegemonic demands of a liberation movement. Whatever the answer, trade unions will increasingly become a force to be reckoned with as the state deepens its commitment to the total strategy. The fact that they straddle the economic and political demands of the workers will guarantee this.

Schools. Particularly since the school riots of June 16, 1976, black schoolchildren have symbolized the revolt against the reforms of the state. Their actions have convulsed urban communities, divided opposition groups, and posed fundamental questions of strategy and control. Given their location in community life, the black youth drew almost the entire spectrum of opposition groups into their struggle: parents, teachers, workers, political organizations, and churches. Understandably many of the extravagant demands and predictions originated from them, as well as some of the worst excesses at the height of the revolt. It was from them that the cry of "Education after Liberation" came as well as the gruesome "necklacing" of enemies of the struggle. Given their youth and anger with the present, it is to be expected that they constitute an enduring source of radicalism in revolt. It is also easy to romanticize or to overevaluate their claims in the broader scope of revolt. However, any opposition group, whether participatory or nonparticipatory, would be foolish to ignore them in planning any large-scale strategy of resistance.

It was also black youth that, perhaps inadvertently, illustrated a fundamental dilemma in the choice between participation and nonparticipation. At one stage during the revolt and in pursuing the goal of "people's education," it was decided to boycott schools and state education. The longer this was done, the more it became evident that an important base of organization and communication had been sacrificed and that there was a very real danger that a whole generation of children would get no education at all. Thus participation facilitated organization, communication, and the development of skills, whereas it lost the dramatic and confrontationist advantages of nonparticipation. At the same time, participation always held the danger of succumbing to co-optive control.

SUMMARY

Although this overview of movements, organizations, and parties involved in some way or other in the revolt against the reforms of the South African state is brief, even cursory, it is sufficient to allow a general juxtaposition between the nature of reform and revolt:

Reform	Revolt
I. Creates a *group* based democracy	1. Creates an *individually* based democracy
2. Concerned with reforming *in* state structures	2. Concerned with reforming *of* state structures
3. Broadens participation through *co-option*	3. Broadens participation through *negotiation*
4. Wants to *multiracialize* South Africa	4. Wants to *nonracialize* South Africa
5. *Adjusts* white domination	5. *Removes* white domination

The ultimate objective of reform is to establish a multiracial government of an autocratic nature; the ultimate objective of

revolt is to establish a nonracial government of a *democratic* nature. Those caught up in revolt may differ among themselves about the nature of that democracy and the socioeconomic structure of society to accompany it, but there is unanimity of purpose that the alternative should be democratic and nonracial. Those concerned with reform and the total strategy may differ among themselves about the scope and quality of reform, but they have unanimity of purpose that white minority control must not be sacrificed under any circumstances, Although those involved with the state's total strategy and reform program are in the minority and lack legitimacy, they have control over powerful resources and are well organized and cohesive, Those who are caught up in revolt are in the majority and enjoy considerable legitimacy but are more divided and organizationally vulnerable. One course of vulnerability and division concerns fundamental differences in strategy.

DIFFERENT STRATEGIES OF RESISTANCE

Sometimes differences in strategies between opposition groupings are tolerable and reflect different histories and emphases. Given the wide range of opposition groupings involved in the revolt against the state policy, this is almost inevitable. But it is when specific strategies are elevated into differences of principle and become an issue on which potential allies in opposition to the state's policies are excommunicated or defined as part of the problem that a measure of the division and fragmentation of opposition can be gained. Very often adherence to a particular strategy reflects an inflexible and dogmatic commitment to a particular theory or agenda of change in South Africa. The reluctance to abandon or even be flexible on aspects of this agenda is transferred into a rigid insistence that a particular strategy is nonnegotiable and its acceptance and support a precondition for qualifying as part of the "democratic struggle" against the state. To the extent that this involves a number of competing strategies, a great deal

of opposition energy is wasted in defining and redefining thresholds of commitment; questioning bona fides and formulating hidden agendas to co-opt and/or weaken perceived competitors in the struggle. A brief discussion of three opposition strategies will illustrate these problems in the current South African situation.

The "Armed Struggle." The reasons why the ANC committed itself to the armed struggle are familiar. It was only after it had pursued all available peaceful means over a period of fifty years and these channels had been systematically removed by the state as well as their organization banned and its leadership incarcerated that the ANC turned to violence. Initially the armed struggle was extremely limited and circumscribed, but gradually the theater of conflict widened and today ANC rhetoric on the armed struggle depicts it as a full-scale "people's war" against the South African state as the enemy. As such, it has become a powerful and symbolic source of mobilization, particularly for black youth in the townships. Anyone who has attended a funeral or protest meeting in one of them and observed the youth "toi-toi-ing" (dancing) and simulating battles and scenes of confrontation, can verify how much this kind of militancy has become part of the culture of resistance.

For a number of reasons, it would be unreasonable to expect the ANC unconditionally to renounce violence — unreasonable in the sense that no political organization would consciously pursue a course of action that would weaken its support or undermine its bargaining ability. At the recent Dakar conference the ANC made it clear again that unless the conditions which led it to embrace the armed struggle were removed, there was no way in which it would reconsider, such conditions being the existence of apartheid — separate-development laws, continued banning of the organization, and imprisonment of the leadership. As Oliver Tambo said before then: "It has been suggested that the regime will talk to us if we abandon violence. Well, this is not serious because it is the regime which is violent and always has been. It

is their violence which has resulted in us embracing violence. Unless they stop their violence, which is very difficult because it is the violence of the apartheid system itself, then it would be unreasonable to expect us to stop our violence."[27]

There is no question that if the ANC should abandon violence in the absence of major concessions from the state, this would lead to considerable loss of standing among the militant youth in the townships where the call for arms has become louder and more persistent. It is often not appreciated that the source of radicalization and increasing militancy of the ANC is much more domestic than external, and the manner in which the state of emergency has been handled by the state added momentum.

However, it is one thing to accept the armed struggle as part of the unfortunate reality of the South African conflict. It is quite another to insist that its acceptance and support is a precondition for participation in any effective opposition to the state's policies. For example, a significant number of white South Africans have abandoned apartheid and any variation of white domination and are willing to oppose co-option and repression and work for a democratic alternative, but these same people drift into a state of immobilized confusion if told that the only way to organize for it is through a commitment to a "people's war" or an "armed struggle."

How central and nonnegotiable is the armed struggle in the National Democratic Revolution of the ANC? How does the manner in which it is conducted exclude or affect other strategies of resistance or opposition? Consider the rhetoric of the following extract from Radio Freedom (Addis Abbaba) and reflect on what a white who wishes to persuade other whites to participate in the democratic opposition must do:

> The first and most important things to do at this time is to organise all combatants and militants into underground cells of the ANC. These cells must consist of a very few persons

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[27]Interview with Oliver Tambo by Steven Freedman, ibid., p. 33.

who know one another very well. These cells must then organise ways of obtaining weapons of war.

We have to realise also that these weapons that are in our country today are meant to commit massacres against our nation. They are there to murder our people. The privileged white community is armed to the teeth. Those weapons also are meant to mow down our people. . . . Those weapons in white hands have to be transferred. We have to use all means available to get them.

In this regard, we call on our compatriots who are working as domestic servants to take a leading role. They know where their employers keep their weapons and they are the ones who can devise plans of transferring the ownership of the weapons. . . . These weapons must be removed from the hands of these trigger-happy murderers. . . .

It is high time now that we put paid to the notion that our struggle will remain confined to the black areas. We who have started confronting the enemy in all directions must make plans of extending our activities into the white areas. The regime's police and soldiers who have been massacring our people in millions over these years still return to their homes and spend comfortable nights in the warmth of their beds.[28]

One can place this kind of rhetoric within the context of a rapidly polarizing situation and dismiss the extravagance of the language as a consequence of brutalizing experiences by those on the receiving end of the state's repressive measures. But it would be shortsighted to underestimate the extent to which Radio Freedom and *Sechaba* (ANC journal) are being used by the state as counterpropaganda instruments for white consumption. As I said earlier, the fact that 85 percent of the whites agreed that there had to be negotiation with blacks but 83 percent said not with the ANC must be seen in this context. At the same time, it is clear that without ANC participation no negotiations can succeed.

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[28]Winrich Kuhne, "Black Politics in South Africa and the Outlook for Meaningful Negotiations," *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik,* conference report SWP-k2524, p. 19.

Quite apart from moral considerations concerning the armed struggle, or even the question of its legitimacy, its effectiveness in opposing the state should not be put beyond debate. This point was stressed, in particular by André Du Toit at the recent Dakar talks.

> The State is relying on the gun, but the power of the gun is limited in what it can achieve. You cannot get children to go to school or get people to pay their rent or choose local governments at the point of a gun.
>
> What then must we make of this paradox? I submit that when we begin to think about strategies of political opposition and resistance, we should not look to a coercive showdown with the State. We should not take on the State where it is strongest. We should rather take on the state where it is weakest, and that is on the political front. That means, I believe, that we have to rethink the whole relation of internal and external opposition, and extra-parliamentary and parliamentary politics.[29]

Sanctions. The imposition of sanctions as a strategy to achieve political objectives is a highly involved and complex issue that has enjoyed considerable attention from scholars with a wide range of interests. The one thing that strikes one when reading their works on the subject, whether they are of radical or moderate persuasion, is the qualified caution with which they preface their predictions and generalizations on sanctions. This is in sharp contrast to the confident statements of those who argued for and against sanctions as a means of resolving or ending the conflict in South Africa. More hot air and nonsense have been spoken on sanctions than make sense. It is as ridiculous to claim that sanctions will not have an impact as it is to claim that they will certainly be successful in achieving the proclaimed objectives. However, people's attitudes on sanctions against the South African regime have been used to judge them on their "commitment to

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[29]André Du Toit, "Beginning the Debate," *Die Suid-Afrikaan,* September 1987, p. 20.

the struggle" or their "opposition to apartheid." The simplistic argument is that if you're for sanctions, you're against apartheid and if you're against sanctions, you're for apartheid. If the issue of sanctions is not to continue to be a divisive factor in opposition or to continue to obscure more relevant problems, then at least the debate must be kept open to the extent that questioning accepted strategies in one movement or organization is not immediately a cause for excommunication from the general "struggle."

It is important to distinguish sanctions from disinvestment and divestment. The word "sanctions" refers to governmental action of a punitive kind directed at a target state with the purpose of realizing specific objectives, such as a regime change or destabilization. "Disinvestment" refers to the sale of foreign companies' assets to local interests. "Divestment" refers to the selling of stocks and shares in companies that trade with a target state. The imposition of sanctions is primarily a political action; disinvestment and divestment, an economic one. What is more, sanctions are imposed by *another* state against a target state; it is an external factor that presumably has to affect an internal situation. Different states can impose different sanctions on different aspects of the internal situation. The consequences of such sanctions may be direct or indirect, positive or negative, long term or short term. Furthermore, sanctions can have both economic and political consequences, and evidence is fairly conclusive that economic effects do not necessarily have the desired political effects.[30]

Two general observations concerning the South African economic and political situation should caution one on being too optimistic about the inevitable success of sanctions. The economy has a viable industrial base, some 60 percent of its export earnings are from low-volume, high-value, difficult-to-sanction items, such as strategic minerals. Accordingly, the economy has a capacity to generate a significant percentage of its annual capital needs internally.

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[30]A summary of literature on sanctions is contained in "Background Briefing No. 38," South African Institute for International Affairs, 1987.

The political dynamics of the South African state and the way in which power and privilege are structured make for a well-insulated power elite. The Afrikaner group in particular is by far the best insulated with 40 percent employed in the state and its supporting structures. Therefore the paradox of sanctions will be (at least in the short to medium term) that certain blacks and English businesses (especially those that rely heavily on exports) will be hurt more than the power elite itself.[31]

The present British ambassador to South Africa was intimately involved with the British involvement in Rhodesia's transformation to Zimbabwe and made a first-hand analysis of the impact of his government's sanctions on that country.

> The purpose of sanctions was conceived initially as being either preventative or remedial. Their main effect, however, has invariably been punitive. There are international circumstances in which it may become necessary to take some punitive action, falling short of the use of force, either to weaken the regime to which sanctions are applied, or, by penalizing it for one undesirable action, to try to deter it from further action of that kind. . . . To abandon altogether the idea of recourse to sanctions in response to acts of aggression or other flagrant violations of international law or human rights, would be to reduce the choice of response to one between military action and acquiescence — an unattractive choice at best of times, and particularly so in the nuclear age. In cases where "real" sanctions are applied, provided (a) they affect a significant proportion of the target country's external trade (or external finance); and (b) there is sufficient international support, they can impose some penalty on the target country. They may have some deterrent effect, though they are not likely to do so if the regime believes its survival in any event to be at stake. Once applied they may, if sufficiently effective, weaken the target regime, but they will not necessarily change its behaviour.[32]

[31]Ibid., p. 4.

[32]Robin Renwick, *Economic Sanctions,* Harvard Studies in International Affairs, no. 45 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 92.

To reduce such complex arguments to the empty tautology that if the outside world were to impose mandatory sanctions, this would bring those in control of the South African state either to their senses, or to their knees, is ridiculous. But to insist further that such a view be uncritically supported as a precondition to be part of the "democratic struggle" is simply counterproductive.

Participation versus Nonparticipation. This issue as a matter of strategy has been dealt with by implication in the discussion on opposition movements and groups. Suffice to say here that, to the extent that nonparticipation as a strategy becomes an end in itself, rather than a means to an end, it will be a divisive issue in the opposition to the state's policies. It has been shown that participation in some spheres is more effective than in others and that these circumstances can change. Rather than adopt an inflexible approach to participating on structures sanctioned by the state, each such opportunity should be evaluated as a basis for organizing resistance and working for a democratic alternative. At present it is more effective to do so in the areas of labor and education than in politics, but this too can change, as the state is forced to make concessions or relax its co-optive demands.

CONCLUSION

The three lectures have attempted to come to grips with the current dynamics of reform and revolt in South Africa. We started off by tracing the ideological shift from apartheid to separate development to the total onslaught. Each shift was necessitated to adjust and legitimize white minority domination, which remains the central issue of domestic and international conflict in South Africa. It was also shown how the shift to the total-onslaught ideology coincided with and facilitated the South African state's reform policy.

In the second lecture, I tried to trace the organizational background and changes for reform. The point was made that it was

difficult to understand the problems relating to the state's reform policy without placing it within the overall context of the South African state's redefinition of its security interests. This is reflected in the deployment of a National Security Management System. This security system pervades the state bureaucracy and directly affects the nature of the reform process on the different constitutional, social, and economic levels. The distinctive feature of the state's constitutional reform is one of co-optive inclusion of the different racial groups without sacrificing white control. Just as revolt against apartheid and separate development was revolt against the minority domination, so the revolt against the South African state's reform policy as part of the total strategy to meet the total onslaught continues to be a revolt against white minority domination.

Thus reform and revolt are intimately linked to one another. The objective of reform is to establish a multiracial autocratic government. The broad objective of those caught up in revolt is to establish a nonracial democratic government. However, there is a fundamental disparity in access and control of resources between those who reform and those who revolt. Although the state is low on legitimacy, it is extremely powerful and, security-wise, well organized. Those in revolt enjoy high legitimacy, but because of repression and other circumstances are not as cohesive and well organized. One of the circumstances responsible for this is deep division on matters of strategy. Greater flexibility is needed to overcome this problem and to consolidate democratic opposition to the state on a broad front.

The struggle is essentially political. Just as the myths of apartheid and separate development had to be exposed as an ideological justification for white domination, so the total onslaught will have to be exposed as well. Until a strategically significant number of whites, and particularly Afrikaners, accept that their future can be ensured not by continued minority domination but by identifying with a genuine democratic alternative,

the pattern of reform, revolt, and repression is likely to continue for quite a while. This still remains the enduring challenge of those who would wish to rid South Africa of racism and exploitation and who work for a nonracial and democratic alternative.