Democratic Alternatives to the Mullahs and the Malls: Citizenship in an Age of Global Anarchy

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I am honored to be here at the University of Utah to deliver the Tanner Lecture on Human Values. This is a time of particular urgency for the democratic and civic values we cherish in America. We are confronted not only by the obvious challenge of terrorism but by the far more subtle perils of a pervasive consumerism rooted in privatization and the seemingly unstoppable spread of a neoliberal ideology. While we remain wedded to democracy in theory, we often seem to regard marketization as the alternative to fundamentalism. Faced with Jihadic terror last fall, our government recommended shopping as an antidote. But consumers are not the same thing as citizens any more than true believers are the same thing as citizens. If our only significant choice is to be between the mullahs and the malls, we may lose our liberty no matter who wins the battle between Jihad and what I have called McWorld.

Perhaps the best way to see the challenge we face is by asking how America is likely to imagine its identity in the new era of globalization, as political sovereignty bleeds away and economic sovereignty takes its place, as the public goods of our republican history are replaced by the private goods of the global marketplace. Our historical character was until quite recently obvious enough: the myths we conceived to account for our national origins and to prophesize a national destiny were founded on the idea of an independent nation conceived not only in liberty but in innocence.

Literature played as large a role here as law in reading the text that was our nation, which is why Ralph Waldo Emerson, Herman Melville, Walt Whitman, and Henry James—not to mention William Faulkner, F. Scott Fitzgerald, Ernest Hemingway, Philip Roth, Saul Bellow, and John Updike more recently—loom so large in imagining the meaning of America. Because no nation has engaged more in self-invention than America, this literature of exceptionalism has played an unusually significant role in constructing the national myths.

Among the myths that fire the American imagination, the myth of innocence is perhaps paramount. At the time of the founding, Europe already looked to America as a "second Eden," a "new land" beckoning a "chosen people." Tom Paine had cast the myth of innocent beginnings as the basis for a revolution that would look not forward but back to recapture the ancient rights and liberties of Englishmen. America, being

a place where men (in Paine's phrase) might "start the world over again," allowed Americans to look back, to live as if "in the beginning of time." Hence Thomas Jefferson's Declaration of Independence recalled rights more natural and ancient than any political bonds, rights that justified the overthrow of an abusive regime. Legitimacy itself acquired in America the ring of innocence—illegitimacy always the child of wayward history and corruption, of rights abused and set aside.

There was a powerful Enlightenment moment in America that seemed to many Europeans an escape from Europe's freighted history. Gazing on the European narrative of intolerance, religious war, persecution, and fratricide, Voltaire called history little more than a record of mankind's errors and follies. How different America seemed. Because the new world was "empty" (the "red man" was invisible in Europe's eyes, part of the continent's flora and fauna), it was quite literally a tabula rasa, a blank tablet upon which new men might inscribe a new history. It was this virgin America that John Locke must have had in mind when he wrote in his *Second Treatise of Civil Government* that those discontent with the constraints of the social contract could seek refuge in the *loci vacui,* the empty places of the world, and start society over again. J. Hector St. John de Crèvecoeur's much read *Letters from an American Farmer,* written in the period between the Revolution and the making of the Constitution, imagined in the American a "new man," and in America itself what Crèvecoeur described as a great "asylum…[where] everything tended to regenerate (Americans): new laws, a new mode of living, a new social system."

James Madison had insisted on the need for a new experimental science to draw up a constitution for a country unlike any for which traditional constitutionalism might be pertinent, and Alexis de Tocqueville recognized in the Jacksonian republic he toured in the early 1830s an entirely new episode in the young history of democracy. The fresh energy and untutored naiveté of America, even after the blood lessons of a terrible civil war, were among Walt Whitman's most touching themes. Slavery and the battle against it notwithstanding, America retained its glow of innocence right through the Gilded Age and into the new century, when Henry James could ponder the persistent foolishness of American innocents abroad and revel in the adventures of the likes of Daisy Miller.

This myth of innocence persisted into and through the twentieth century and persists down into our new millennium today. In the last

century, it spawned an isolationist foreign policy that made America reluctant to enter Europe's corrupt wars until forced to do so (oh so reluctantly in World War I, and only by dint of a [to the American imagination] typically treacherous enemy surprise attack in World War II). Isolationism was and is about more than just chauvinism or narcissism. It represents the conviction that to stay pure America must steer clear of foreign involvements; that its foreign policy cannot follow base interest as Europe's has, but must be conducted in the name of all-American values such as democracy, liberty, and piety. When the nation has finally intervened in foreign wars, whether in Mexico at the beginning of the twentieth century or Vietnam toward the end of the century, it has always sought justification by reference to its own goodwill, its praeternatural innocence that put its motives beyond scrutiny. We went down to Mexico, proclaimed President Woodrow Wilson, to make it safe for democracy. We were in Vietnam, insisted John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon too, to preserve democracy from totalitarian communism. And today we exude the rage of wronged innocents against an "axis of evil"—the "evil ones" whose diabolical nature seems for Americans to elude all rational explanation. Where others pursue blunt and amoral interests, we pursue—at least in our own eyes—only virtue.

This myth of innocence also survives into the new millennium in the peculiar but persistent pursuit of an antimissile defense, a space shield that, as the two oceans once distanced us from the world's corruptions, will today (it is promised) encapsulate us in a magic bubble through which those new foreign villains—rogue states, Communist societies, and scheming terrorists—will be unable to penetrate. Never mind that such enemies are more likely to use biological or chemical warfare or transport dirty nuclear bombs on container ships or single-engine Cessnas; never mind that scientists are unanimous in arguing that the system can't work; never mind that the World Trade Center was assaulted from inside the country not from outside: the idea of a technology that protects inner good from outer evil, innocence from corruption, Eden from the seething lands East of Eden, appeals deeply to an irrational American exceptionalist core. Not America the good or America the virtuous, but America the innocent, still at the beginning of time, still unwilling to buy into the world's legalistic treaties and treacherous multilateralism, still insistent on retaining the full measure of its sovereignty, still believing its boundaries can be secured permanently against

corruption by outsiders if only a bubble can be built large enough, if only the frontiers can be rendered impermeable, if only a mythic technology can rescue a mythic innocence from the timeless predators forever stalking it from afar.

Yet if September 11 exacerbated the conviction that America is an innocent giant being hounded by diabolical pygmies it can know only as "the evil ones," it left the myth of American isolation and American independence in tatters. In fact, independence, like sovereignty, has had a threadbare quality as an idea for some time. America may possess smart bombs and an innovative weapons technology, but it is lumbered with dumb ideas and an antiquarian political theory of sovereignty that obstruct effective responses to the twin threats posed to democracy by postmodernity—anarchist terrorism and anarchist markets.

The two great wars of the last century signaled to most of the world's nations an end to the era of sovereign independence. And though America fought those wars reluctantly, and only on foreign soil via the export of its troops, they should have taught it that no nation could remain safe and free apart from others who were under the gun. And in the half-century following World War II, the ineluctable interdependence of the planet—driven by technology, telecommunications, ecology, epidemiology, and the global economy—had to be apparent to anyone willing to look squarely at the new world. AIDS carried no passport, global warming refused to stop at customs frontiers, the internet could not be regulated by national governments, and the economy went global without so much as a backward glance at the protesting faces of national governments and their betrayed and often disemployed workers.

Well before September 11, the lesson taught on that fateful day by the brutal teachers from Al-Qaeda and the Taliban (how well named they were—Taliban as teachers!) should have been apparent. For not only the terrorists pursuing their fundamentalist Jihad but the ardent market advocates of what I have called McWorld have been engaged in systematically undermining the sovereignty of nation states, dismantling the democratic institutions that have been their finest achievement, without showing the way to extend democracy either downward to the subnational religious and ethnic entities that now lay claim to people's loyalty or upward to the international sector in which McWorld's pop culture and commercial markets along with criminals and terrorists operate without sovereign restraints.

Unlike America, which pretended right up to September 11 that it

still enjoyed sovereign independence, taking responsibility neither for the global reach of its popular culture (McWorld) nor for the secularizing and trivializing character of its adamant materialism, the terrorists acknowledged and exploited the actual interdependence that characterizes human relations in the twenty-first century. Theirs, however, is a perverse and malevolent interdependence, one in which they have learned to use McWorld's weight jujitsu style against its massive power. Ironically, even as it fosters an anarchic absence of sovereignty at the global level, the United States has resisted the slightest compromise of its national sovereignty at home. America has complained bitterly in recent years about the prospect of surrendering a scintilla of its own sovereignty, whether to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) commanders, to supranational institutions such as the international criminal tribunal, or to international treaties such as those banning landmines or regulating fossil fuels (global warming). Even today as the United States pursues a military campaign against terrorism surrounded by an ever more reluctant coalition, it has made clear that it prefers "coalitions" to "alliances" because it wants to be free to target objectives, develop strategy, and wage war exactly as it wishes. Indeed, it continues to oppose the new International Criminal Tribunal, which could be used to try the terrorists that America is busy capturing.

Yet terrorism has already made a mockery of sovereignty. What was the hijacking of airliners, the calamitous razing of the World Trade Towers, the brash attack on the Pentagon, but a profound obliteration of American sovereignty? Terrorism is the negative and depraved form of that interdependence that in its positive and beneficial form we too often refuse to acknowledge. As if still in the nineteenth century, America has persuaded itself that its options today are to preserve an ancient and blissfully secure independence that puts us in charge of American destiny or to yield to a perverted and compulsory interdependence that puts foreigners and alien international bodies like the United Nations or the World Court in charge of American destiny. In truth, however, Americans have not enjoyed a real independence since sometime before the great wars of the last century. Certainly not since the advent of AIDs and the West Nile virus, of global warming and an ever more porous ozone layer, of a job "mobility" that has decimated America's industrial economy, and of restive speculators who have made "capital flight" a more "sovereign" reality than any conceivable government oversight. Interdependence is not some foreign adversary against which citizens

need to muster resistance. It is a domestic reality that already has compromised the efficacy of citizenship in scores of unacknowledged and uncharted ways.

It was the interdependence of America with the world and the interdependence of shared economic and technological systems everywhere on which the Jihadic warriors counted when they brought terror to the American homeland. They not only hijacked America's air transportation system, turning its airplanes into deadly missiles; they provoked an autoimmune response, impelling the nation into closing it down entirely for nearly a week. They not only destroyed the cathedral of American capitalism at the World Trade Center; they forced capitalism into autoimmune shock, where it fell into recession with the stock market in free fall. How can any nation claim independence under these conditions?

Our only viable choice concerns the character of the interdependence we will face. We can have our interactivity dictated to us by violence and anarchy or we can construct it on the model of our own democratic aspirations. We can have a democratic and useful interdependence on whatever common ground we can persuade others to stand on, or we can stand on the brink of anarchy and try to prevent criminals and terrorists from pushing us into the abyss.

It will be hard for defenders of modernity—whether of McWorld's markets or democracy's citizenship—to have it both ways. Terrorism turns out to be a depraved version of globalization no less vigorous in its pursuit of its own special interests than are global markets, no less wedded to anarchist disorder than are speculators, no less averse to violence when it serves their ends than marketers are averse to inequality and injustice when they represent the "costs of doing business." It is their instinctive reading of this equation that turns poor people into cheering mobs when Americans experience grievous losses. It is their perception of overwhelming hypocrisy that leads them to exult where we would wish for them to grieve. Here we come face to face with globalization, which offers to us the specter not of citizen warriors arrayed against anarchy and terrorism but of consumer narcissists embedded in that very same anarchy: an anarchy that has spawned terrorism.

The encompassing practices of globalization that we have nurtured have in fact created an ironic and radical asymmetry: we have managed to globalize markets in goods, labor, currencies, and information without globalizing the civic and democratic institutions that have histori-

cally constituted the free market's indispensable context. Put simply, we have removed capitalism from the institutional "box" that has (quite literally) domesticated it and given its sometimes harsh practices a human face.

From the birth of markets in the seventeenth-century nation state to the rise of the welfare and regulatory state in the twentieth century, the freedom of the market has been secured only by the discipline of the law. Ripped from the juridical and legislative box of regulatory institutions and civic infrastructure, markets spin freely into hyperspace, generating a "wild" capitalism that looks like anarchy and that is corrosive not only to the national democracy on which it once relied but to its own operation as a competition-based global economic system.

I have examined the dynamics of globalization in detail in my *Jihad vs. McWorld* and will not rehearse those arguments here. But McWorld has proceeded apace, and globalization has a new face as we cross the millennial threshold. It is ever more efficient in its domination of other sectors because it acts today in concert with privatization, commercialization, and a consumer culture that has both infantilized consumers and had a totalizing effect on society. This concert of forces has been damaging to the pluralism of our society and the democracy of our political and civic life. To survive the slow passing of the nation state, democracy will itself have to find a road to globalization.

To understand why taking capitalism "out of the box" has been so calamitous, we need to recall that the history of capitalism and free markets has been one of synergy with democratic institutions. Free economies have grown up within and been fostered and contained and controlled by democratic states. Democracy has been a precondition for free markets—not, as economists try to argue today, the other way round. The freedom of the market that has helped sustain freedom in politics and a spirit of competition in the political domain has been nurtured in turn by democratic institutions. Contract law and regulation as well as cooperative civic relations have attenuated capitalism's Darwinism and contained its irregularities, its contradictions, and its tendencies toward self-destruction around monopoly and the eradication of competition.

On the global plane today, the historical symmetry that paired democracy and capitalism has gone missing. We have globalized the marketplace willy-nilly because markets can bleed through porous national boundaries and are not constrained by the logic of sovereignty;

but we have not even begun to globalize democracy, which—precisely because it is political and is defined by sovereignty—is "trapped" inside the nation-state box.

With the spread of the new globalization, the asymmetry between private vices and public goods has deepened. In globalizing private rather than public goods, we have managed, however inadvertently, to globalize many of our vices and almost none of our virtues. We have globalized crime, globalized the rogue weapons trade, and globalized hate propaganda. And, as has become so painfully clear, we have globalized terrorism—sometimes (ironically) using the modern technologies of international capital and the worldwide web itself to promote ideologies hostile both to technology and to anything smacking of the worldwide or the modern. We have also globalized drugs, pornography, and the trade in women and children made possible by "porn tourism." Indeed, the most egregious globalization has been the globalization of the exploitation and abuse of children in war, pornography, poverty, and sex tourism.

Nowhere are children more abused now than in this international arena, where their interests cannot possibly be represented other than by the price their services bring as prostitutes, slave laborers, involuntary organ donors, or soldiers. Tribal wars can now be primarily conducted through and against children, our proxy consumers and now our proxy warriors in the new century. It is a toss-up whether a nine-year-old girl born into poverty in Brazil or Thailand can be more profitably exploited by selling her virginity or her kidneys. (This is no hyperbolic metaphor: there is a lively illicit traffic in human organs "farmed" from the invisible street children of the Third World for medical use in the First World.) Following America's "successful" war in Afghanistan, impoverished parents are still engaged in "selling" their children to wealthier neighbors, who use them as slave labor in family-run firms, or to the international adoption market.

At the same time, to complete the ring of irony, Third World nations complain bitterly when First World nations try to protect children. In their jaundiced but not unreasonable view, the First World assault on indentured child labor is stealth protectionism to keep jobs in First World countries. After all, it is often children who suffer the most when the International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditions its loans on "structural adjustments" that, in balancing budgets or reducing social programs, lower living standards for those already in poverty. What is

clear is that only the establishment of internationally enforceable standards can prevent this devastating race to the bottom. Until then, one way or the other, children will bear the burdens of "efficient" competition.

In his prescient three-volume study of globalization called *The Information Age* (vol. 1, *The Rise of the Network Society*) sociologist Manuel Castells sums up the awful toll in terms that link the abuse of children directly with the new logic of economic globalization. He insists that the exploitation of children is not an *ad hoc* add-on but an integral feature of new global markets in the absence of global law and international democracy:

> There is a systematic link between the current, unchecked characteristics of informational capitalism and the destruction of lives in a large segment of the world's children. What is different is the disintegration of traditional societies through the world exposing children to the unprotected lands of mega-city slums. What is different is children in Pakistan weaving carpets for world-wide export via networks of suppliers to large department stores in affluent markets. What is new is mass global tourism organized around pedophilia. What is new is electronic child pornography on the Net, worldwide. What is new is the disintegration of patriarchalism without being replaced by systems of protection of children provided either by new families or the state. What is new is the weakening of institutions of support for children's rights such as labour unions or the politics of social reform.[1]

In the First World we milk their dollars and euros; in the Third World we expropriate their labor and their bodies: surely children have become the new engine of global capitalism.

The global economy's impact on children is but one example of its civic sterility. Lacking a civic envelope, it cannot support the values and institutions associated with civic culture, religion, and the family; nor can it enjoy their potentially softening, domesticating, and civilizing impact on raw market transactions. No wonder Pope John Paul said in his Apostolic Exhortation on the Mission of the Roman Catholic Church in the Americas: "If globalization is ruled merely by the laws of the market applied to suit the powerful, the consequences cannot but be

[1] Manuel Castells, *The Information Age,* vol. 1: *The Rise of the Network Society* (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 1996; 2d ed. 2000), p. 250.

negative."[2] Of course one expects the pope to moralize in this fashion. More startling is a similar message from another, more powerful pope of the secular world, who wrote recently: "You hear talk about a new financial order, about an international bankruptcy law, about transparency, and more…but you don't hear a word about people.… Two billion people live on less than two dollars a day.… We live in a world that gradually is getting worse and worse and worse. It is not hopeless, but we must do something about it now." The moralist here is the hardheaded James Wolfensohn, president of the World Bank, who has begun to replace the bank's traditional energy and industrialization projects thought to favor the interests of foreign investors with environmental and health projects aimed at the interests of the populations being directly served.[3]

There are of course extant international institutions that might serve as building blocks for a global democratic box into which the economy could safely be put. The international financial institutions conceived at Bretton Woods after World War II to oversee the reconstruction of the shattered European and Asian economies were intended originally to function as regulatory agencies to assure peaceful, stable, and democratic redevelopment under the watchful eye of the victorious allied powers. Though the World Bank and the IMF (and later the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT] and the World Trade Organization [WTO] that grew out of it in 1995) were ostensibly forged as instruments of democratic sovereign nations designed to guide and regulate global private-sector interests in the name of public-sector reconstruction, over time they became instruments of the very private-sector interests they were meant to channel and keep in check. Those who today call for their elimination in the name of transparency, accountability, and democracy might be surprised to learn that these norms were once regarded as among the postwar financial order's primary objectives. Given the role that the modern institutions representing this order play as potential pieces in a global regulatory infrastructure, one way to begin the process of global democratization would be to redemocratize them and subordinate them to the will of democratic peoples.

[2] Pope John Paul's Apostolic Exhortation, cited in the *New York Times,* January 24, 1999.

[3] James D. Wolfensohn, president of the World Bank, cited by Jim Hoagland, "Richer and Poorer," *Washington Post National Weekly Edition,* May 3, 1999, p. 5.

When and if America finally turns from its mythic independence about which I spoke at the beginning of this lecture and acknowledges the real world of interdependence that terrorism and global markets have forced it to confront, it will face an irony it helped to create: the international institutions it needs to turn interdependence into a tool of transnational democracy and international comity are few and far between. McWorld is everywhere, seeming to represent Jihad's primary alternative. Nike and McDonald's and Coke and MTV can contribute nothing to the search for democratic alternatives to criminal terrorism. They inadvertently contribute to its causes: that is the melancholy dialectic of what I have called Jihad vs. McWorld. The mullahs will not be seduced by the malls; and even if they were, consumers are still not citizens.

For most of the world, citizens and consumers alike are beyond the pale. Too often for people living in the Third World to the south of the developed nations, globalization looks at best like a kind of consumerist gulag where local religious and ethnic values are annihilated; and at worst like an imperious strategy of a predominantly American economic behemoth. Too often what we understand as the opportunities to secure liberty and prosperity at home seem to them but a rationalization for exploitation and oppression in the international sphere; too often what we call the international order is for them an international disorder. Our neoliberal antagonism to all political regulation in the global sector, to all institutions of legal and political oversight, and to all attempts at democratizing globalization and institutionalizing economic justice looks to them like brute indifference to their welfare and their claims for justice. Western beneficiaries of McWorld celebrate market ideology with its commitment to the privatization of all things public and the commercialization of all things private and consequently insist on total freedom from government interference in the global economic sector. Yet laissez-faire's total freedom from interference becomes the rule of private power over public goods and is just another name for anarchy. Terror is merely one of the many contagious diseases that anarchy spawns.

There is hope, however. Democracy may be under siege, caught between the anarchy of terrorism and the anarchy of global markets, but democracy is always under siege—a never-ending practice, not a destination or end state.

Well before the calamities of September 11, a significant movement in the direction of constructive interdependence, democratic transnationalism, and global justice was evident—if not necessarily in official U.S. foreign policy. Even as it proclaimed its innocence, America developed a rhetoric of rights and a commitment (however hypocritical it sometimes seemed) to democratic values. Although fractious and incoherent, the movement has represented a counterpoint to the continuing official American posture of unilateralism in international affairs and neoliberalism in global market international economics. Some of its constituent elements, though by no means in perfect harmony, included:

- the antiglobalization movement, which includes at least some groups (Attac, among others) whose aim has been less to arrest than to transform the globalization process;
- the Jubilee 2000 campaign that worked successfully to achieve a major reduction of between one-third and one-half in Third World debt;
- the "Community of Democracies" (initiated by the American State Department under Madeline Albright and continued under Colin Powell) and a group of international Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) (with leadership from Freedom House and the Open Society Institute) initiated in Warsaw last spring (2001), with meetings planned for Seoul, Korea, and Chile in the coming years;
- generic international NGOs such as Amnesty International, Doctors without Borders (which won the Nobel Prize), and Transparency International (targeting governmental corruption), which have become "generic" international NGOs that help to forge global public opinion;
- the Millennium Summit's Development Goals Project, established by the United Nations to provide responses to global poverty, illiteracy, and disease—reaffirmed at the Monterrey Conference on Development in March 2002;
- the Zedillo Commission's work on development financing, calling on developed nations to devote 0.7 percent of their Gross National Products (GNPs) for (nonmilitary) development assistance (vs. an average for Europe of 0.2 percent today and under 0.1 percent for the United States);

- the "Madrid Club"—an innovative group made up of ex-presidents committed to establishing a "club of Rome"–style group exploring issues of globalization and justice;
- the "Bled" (Slovenia) initiative issuing in an international "ethical collegium" led by President Milan Kucan of Slovenia and former prime minister Michel Rocard of France as well as ambassador Stefan Hessel and Benjamin Barber to address global issues of democracy and justice;
- the new internationalism of the American Federation of Labor/Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL/CIO), expressed in a new foreign policy document devoted to international cooperation and represented on the ground in seventeen Islamic nations;
- the Open Society Institute (George Soros's civil society foundation), which has operated for many years in scores of countries to help develop civic infrastructure to undergird political democracy in emerging and transitional democracies and has been the vital force in the establishing of Central European University in Budapest and Prague;
- Civicus, the transnational umbrella organization for NGOs now in its eighth year, currently under the presidency of Kumi Naidoo, with critical annual international meetings, the most recent one in Vancouver;
- the Democracy Collaborative, a new association of universities (two dozen in the United States and several abroad) under the leadership of the University of Maryland, aspiring to engage educational institutions and their resources in the struggle for more just communities locally, nationally, and globally;
- Global Compact, 400 corporations gathering under the aegis of UN secretary Kofi Annan to develop the best civic practices for global firms;
- the World Economic Forum at Davos (meeting in New York in 2002 with fifty world religious leaders and newly focused on global stability and civic order).

I try your patience with this list to make it clear that transnational democracy is no idle pipe dream. There are many eddies and currents that, even before September 11, offered a countertide of implicit opposition against an American mainstream that emphasized sovereignty, independence, and, too often, unilateralism—military and economic

strategy at the expense of civic and democratic strategy (most recently with a frightening revival of nuclear war talk). The terrorist attack transformed the context, turning what heretofore have been widely seen as matters of idealism and wishful thinking into issues of national security and the survival of democratic governance. In closing the door on the era when nineteenth-century notions of sovereignty and national independence were understood as the foundation of American security, anarchic terrorism has opened a window for those who believe that social injustice, unregulated wild capitalism, and an aggressive secularism that leaves no space for religion and civil society are both the conditions on which terrorism feeds and at the same time forces vulnerable to remediation.

This train of events has brought America to a seminal moment in the world's history—one in which trauma opens up the possibilities of new forms of action against which "realism" is no longer an effective argument. The moment, laced by fear, throws up both new opportunities for nationalism and jingoism, unilateralism, and technological and military warfare (with a new and frightening emphasis on bio-weapons and nuclear arms) and new opportunities for collaboration, multilateralism, and movements for social and cultural justice. Fear and rage have led the Bush administration to address a so-called axis of evil, but they can equally well provide the occasion to address the axis of inequality, which is a mirror image of the axis of evil. In March 2002 President George W. Bush offered a 50 percent increase over three years in nonmilitary foreign aid given by the United States, a stunning turnaround for a conservative Republican administration.

These multilateral moves are crucial. For if terror's consequence is only jingoism and vengeance—a "good crusade" against Jihad's "bad crusade" that actually worsens the international environment in ways the terrorists hope for—the terrorists will have won. The point of terror is to provoke a kind of autoimmune reaction in its targets, to catalyze a self-destruction that does the work of annihilation that the terrorist is powerless to achieve.

These dangers can be averted by a strategy that coordinates the many forces already in play and unites them around a common vision and a broad strategy capable of attracting widespread support among political and opinion leaders and ordinary people alike. There is no need to supersede or replace the effective organizations noted above or the dozens of

others like them with some singular project. Pluralism and diversity are democracy's strengths—especially in this resistance phase, where the aim is to alter the shape of international affairs and offer a civic challenge to the anarchy of both global terrorism and wild capitalism. Yet there is a need to coordinate the many different policies and aims of these organizations and to forge a movement that can appeal beyond the Western world, where most of them operate, to include the South as well as the North, developing as well as developed nations, societies outside the pale of the WTO as well as those inside it. For this, a generic rhetoric and a common set of symbols aimed at forging a common campaign are indispensable, so that all of the emerging forces of transnationalism, interdependence, and civic globalism can combine to constitute a counterweight to global market forces and a check both on global economic anarchy and on global terror.

In this spirit and in the spirit of the Tanner Lectures on Human Values, I want tonight to call for a "CivWorld Citizens Campaign for Democracy." The campaign assumes not that constituent players will in any way surrender or subordinate their own purposes to it but only that they will join in the effort as a complementary and reinforcing aspect of their current work, making the campaign their primary vehicle for cooperation and joint action with others. In keeping with this objective, the CivWorld Campaign will develop both a common set of symbolic relationships manifesting global citizenship and a common set of activities, around which global citizenship can identify its meaning and which can be comfortably embraced by the many different groups currently engaged in democratizing globalization.

The merchandizing of global markets as well as the fear-mongering of terrorism have left little room for the symbols of citizenship. Neither fanatic "true believers" nor obsessive material consumers take the place of engaged citizens. Citizenship bridges and unites where Jihadic commitments divide and consumer impulses privatize. The CivWorld Campaign begins with the premise that to overcome Jihadic terrorism requires more than a military campaign against terror itself: it also demands a civic campaign against the global inequities that permit terrorism to breed and generate. It assumes that democratizing globalization and adjudicating the tensions between the North and South with concrete proposals for change can provide a viable and attractive alternative to passivity and spectatorship and hence respond not only to terrorism

but to the torpor and fear it has instilled. Indeed, the very phrase "CivWorld" is intended to convey a world that is civil (nonviolent and tolerant), civic (public-spirited and action-oriented in the direction of public goods), and civilized (promoting space for and a culture of creativity [the arts], worship [religion], play [entertainment, sports, and recreation], and learning [education, research, and scholarship]). In short, a world that is pluralistic, democratic, and just. There is no stronger defense against terrorism, no clearer expression of humanity's common promise, no better path to a democratized globalism in which people come first.

The CivWorld Campaign for Democracy (www.civworld.org) takes the form of a multifaceted program for a bottom-up citizens' democracy. The key components include:

1. The **Declaration of Interdependence:** the basic document of the CivWorld campaign, which has been signed by thousands of citizens in two dozen countries, is accessible on-line (at (www.civworld.org or www.declarationofinterdependence.org) and was formally promulgated at the first Interdependence Day celebration in Philadelphia on September 12, 2003. The Declaration reads:

THE DECLARATION OF INTERDEPENDENCE

We the people of the world do herewith declare our interdependence as individuals and members of distinct communities and nations. We do pledge ourselves citizens of one CivWorld, civic, civil and civilized. Without prejudice to the goods and interests of our national and regional identities, we recognize our responsibilities to the common goods and liberties of humankind as a whole.

We do therefore pledge to work both directly and through the nations and communities of which we are also citizens:

> To guarantee justice and equality for all by establishing on a firm basis the human rights of every person on the planet, ensuring that the least among us may enjoy the same liberties as the prominent and the powerful;
>
> To forge a safe and sustainable global environment for all—which is the condition of human survival—at a cost to peoples based on their current share in the world's wealth;

To offer children, our common human future, special attention and protection in distributing our common goods, above all those upon which health and education depend;

To establish democratic forms of global civil and legal governance through which our common rights can be secured and our common ends realized;

and

To foster democratic policies and institutions expressing and protecting our human commonality;

and at the same time,

To nurture free spaces in which our distinctive religious, ethnic and cultural identities may flourish and our equally worthy lives may be lived in dignity, protected from political, economic and cultural hegemony of every kind.

2. **Interdependence Day:** In conjunction with the Declaration, the CivWorld campaign for Global Democracy has sponsored a new, international "Interdependence Day." On September 12, 2003, the first Interdependence Day celebration was held in Philadelphia across the street from the Liberty Bell in a ceremony in which 400 people participated. Among the dignitaries taking part were Senator Gary Hart, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) goodwill ambassador Harry Belafonte, former college presidents John Brademas (New York University) and Yolanda Moses (City College of New York), former Palermo mayor Leoluca Orlando, and representatives of Philadelphia's mayor and Pennsylvania's governor. A parallel ceremony was held in Budapest, Hungary, where former president Arpad Goencz and parliamentary leader Ivan Vitanyi presided. In 2004 the city of Rome will play host to the second Interdependence Day ceremonies. Other cities and many American college campuses will also celebrate this new international day recognizing global civic interdependence.
3. **A CivWorld "Civic Interdependence Curriculum"** to enhance the international elements in civic education curricula in the United States and abroad. A pilot curriculum will be

introduced in selected schools in the United States and in Italy (the site of the second Interdependence Day ceremony) in 2004.

4. **A CivWorld Citizens Passport:** a passport-sized booklet containing the Declaration of Interdependence, signifying the commitment of its bearers to global interdependence.

These four elements of the CivWorld program are already in development. Additional elements projected for the future include:

5. **A Self-Tithe CivWorld Fund:** a voluntary progressive self-tax of 0.01 percent on income, to be donated to the CivWorld Citizens Fund and (to avoid any hint of waste, bureaucracy, or corruption) to be used exclusively for CivWorld asset transfers and programs in which CivWorld citizens will participate in establishing and choosing (CivWorld overhead will be paid from other funds, raised independently).
6. **The CivWorld Service Program:** a program of community and other civic services to be undertaken by CivWorld citizens, along with a pledge of three hours per week to be spent on such services by members; to be reinforced by government-sponsored service programs such as AMERICORPS (embraced by President Bush in his speech to the nation on November 8, 2001).
7. **The CivWorld Network:** an internet portal offering interactive information, education, cultural, and communication services to be used in connection with CivWorld deliberation and decision-making (on-line now in preliminary form at www.civworld.org).
8. **CivWorld Deliberation and Decision-Making:** a program to assure participation by all CivWorld citizens in debate, deliberation, and decision-making about expenditures to be made under the CivWorld.
9. **CivWorld Citizen Constituencies Program:** a set of CivWorld programs adapted to the particular strengths and needs of discrete constituencies, including the corporate community, NGOs, religious institutions, arts organizations and institutions, unions and syndicates, schools and educational institutions, and media and news organizations (and others).
10. **ChildWorld:** a program to make education and the development of adequate schooling for all children the linchpin of every international reform and every program of foreign aid and invest-

ment—based on the belief that education is the key to democratic citizenship, job competence, civic and political stability, and equal opportunity for all; accompanied by a publicity and press campaign focused on children as globalization's most frequent victims and as democracy's most important resource ("Lucky Kids"). A "CivWorld Interdependence Curriculum" has already been written and is being introduced in selected American and Italian schools.

11. **The Arts of Democracy:** a program focused on the role of the arts as democracy's core and civil society's engine.
12. **A CivWorld Foreign Policy Platform** focused on the United States (as the state with the greatest power and the greatest need for policy change) but adaptable to the needs of citizens of other nations.